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Introduction 
 
 
 
The topic of counteracting the laundering of proceeds from crime has gained relevance 
due to the significant volume of criminal investments penetrating the legal economy. The 
tendency of increasing the share of criminal capital in the economy is relevant for all states of 
the world. 
The money laundering procedure is typical for almost all forms of organized crime, 
which distorts the process of making economic decisions, undermines financial institutions, 
aggravates social problems and, most importantly, promotes corruption. 
To date, the profit obtained by criminal means is used for many purposes, for example, 
to cover costs associated with crimes, for investment in the sphere of activity of criminal 
organizations, for development of criminal business, for investment in legal economy. 
Obviously, all that part of income that is subject to investment in legal sectors of economy 
and placement in international financial markets requires money laundering. 
The relevance of the problem of combating money laundering and financing of 
terrorism increases because of a reduction in revenues at all levels of a budgetary system, an 
increase in the expenditures required to finance the law enforcement sector and budget deficit. 
The danger of the money laundering has multiply increased in the modern world and is 
a concern of the overwhelming majority of countries in the world community. Globalization 
of the world financial system raises the issue of the need to coordinate the efforts of states and 
international organizations in combating laundering of criminal proceeds at the global level. 
Today, special international and regional organizations, which cause changes in the legal 
regulation of public relations in this sphere, both at the level of a single state and at the 
international level, have been set up. 
One of the most important strategic lines for ensuring the economic security of a 
country is combating laundering of criminal proceeds, which includes their detection, seizure 
and confiscation. 
This thesis will be theoretical and practical in nature. The purpose of this paper is to 
clarify the legalization (laundering) of money or other property acquired by criminal means, 
the existing national and international mechanisms to counteract this crime, and to identify the 
main trends in the development of national and international criminal legal means of 
combating it. These goals may be achieved as a result of the following objectives: 
5 
 
• to reveal the social essence and danger to the public of laundering the property 
acquired by criminal means, and to characterize its nature; 
•  to determine the impact of legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds on the 
national and global economy; 
•  to consider the major modern money laundering models; 
•  to investigate legal tools for combating money laundering; 
•  to analyze in the practical part of the thesis the ways how criminal groups launder 
money. 
The object of the thesis is legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds, as well as 
criminal legal means to combat it, existing at the national and international levels. 
The subject of the research is social and economic problems arising from an increase 
in the number of crimes associated with money laundering.  
The theoretical and methodological background of the paper is international laws and 
regulations, monographs of experts, materials of periodical press devoted to the problems of 
combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. 
The empirical base of the research is compiled by data of Banca d'Italia, Egmont 
Group, FATF, the Auditing Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Federal Financial 
Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation (Rosfinmonitoring) and others. 
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First Chapter 
 
 
Money Laundering: origins and  
the modern models of laundering  
 
1.1 Origins of the money laundering concept in US, Russia and Europe 
 
 
It is traditionally believed that the “money-laundering” concept arose in the United 
States in the 20s of the 20
th
 century and is associated with the activities of famous Chicago 
gangster Alfonso Capone. In 1920, the 18
th
 Amendment to the US Constitution adopted by the 
Congress back in 1917 and ratified on January 16, 1919 entered into force the United States 
representing: 
«Section 1.After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation 
thereof from the United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for 
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 
Section 2.The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
Section 3.This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an 
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the 
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the 
Congress
1». This was the so-called “dry law” (Prohibition). 
Implementation of this law caused a negative attitude on the part of the middle class, 
which led to the inevitable emergence and distribution of secret production and smuggling of 
alcoholic beverages. There was a brisk trade in alcohol at fabulously high prices in the 
“black” market. Illegal production, smuggling and transportation of alcoholic beverages were 
the most widespread in the country during the first years of the action of the Vojsted Act 
adopted in 1919 for the practical implementation of the 18
th
 Amendment to the Constitution. 
This was done by numerous underground organizations of bootleggers, whereof profits were 
estimated at millions of dollars. The result of their operation was an unprecedented rampage 
of corruption, bribery and gangsterism
2
. 
                                                          
1
 United States Constitution, 09/17/1787. 
2
 History of the USA (1918-1945). Ed. by Sevastyanova G.N., 1985, page 108. 
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The resulting excess profits required the introduction of these illegal incomes in the 
legal turnover, that is, money “clearing” and “laundering”. According to a popular version, 
cash from bootlegging was mixed with the proceeds (usually, metal coins) from a network of 
self-service laundries (landromat) owned by Alfonso Capone. Thus, legitimization (money-
laundering) of illegally obtained money was carried out. 
However, let now address to the history of Russia. On the example of monuments of 
the Russian law, several examples of the “money-laundering” concept as a social 
phenomenon can be singled out. The Pskov Court Charter of 1467 distinguished between the 
legal and illegal methods of acquiring property
3
. To confirm the legality of a sale and 
purchase transaction, in accordance with this instrument, it was necessary to take an oath 
before the buyer that the new property was acquired legally. Thus, the Pskov Court Charter 
restricts the range of transactions that require confirmation of legality to the purchase of new 
things only. Article 46 of the Code of Laws of 1497 requires confirmation of the legality of a 
transaction on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses in whose presence the purchase and 
sale transaction was made. However, an oath was also allowed in the absence of witnesses
4
. 
The Code of Laws of 1550 extends the requirement for a person to prove the legality 
of acquiring both new and old property. In accordance with this act, the condition for the 
legitimacy of a purchase and sale transaction was the existence of a guarantee for the seller. 
The guarantee was a common security on the part of constant market traders. In the absence 
of a security, the buyer lost the right to claim
5
. 
The Council (Church) Code of 1649 has also established responsibility for the 
purchase and sale of things committed without any security. In this case, the notion of the 
legality of possession extends to the use of this thing. In addition, responsibility is established 
not only for the concealment of criminals, but also for the acceptance, storage or sale of stolen 
property. Thus, a legal prohibition on the legitimization of property obtained illegally has 
been established. 
The opening of the Russian borders with the European states under Peter the Great 
leads to entering into bilateral international treaties concerning the suppression of war crimes 
in terms of seizure and sharing of spoils of war. Among these documents it is possible to 
single out the Convention with Denmark as of June 9, 1715 and the Treaty with Prussia, 
which, by prohibiting looting, disciplined the troops
6
 and became the progenitors of modern 
                                                          
3
 Pskov Court Charter, 1467, page 47. 
4
 Vladimirsky-Budanov M.F. Chrestomathy on the history of Russian law. Issue. 2. Kiev. 1880, page 87. 
5
 Russian legislation of the 10th-20th centuries. In 9 vols. Legislation of the period of formation and 
strengthening of the Russian centralized state. 1998, page 69. 
6
 Bobrovsky P.O. Military law in Russia under Peter the Great. Issue 2, part 2, St. Petersburg, page 582. 
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acts and instruments relating to combating cross-border crime. The Military Regulations of 
1716 defined the conditions for recognizing property as spoils of war: this includes property 
seized from the enemy, provided that the enemy had this property in its possession for at least 
24 hours. At the same time, the previous owner of the seized property was not entitled to 
demand its return, since it was considered spoils of war. 
The Criminal and Correctional Penal Code of 1885 established responsibility for the 
sale of immovable property stolen or taken by force, for the purchase of immovable property 
from a person who owns it illegally
7
. By their generic feature, these provisions are very close 
to the modern concept of legalization.  
As for the Western history, here the development of the concept of legalization 
(laundering) of proceeds from crime, which has grown into modern legislation on combating 
the laundering of proceeds from crime, has progressed even more rapidly. It all started back in 
the Middle Ages. The first “financial harbours” were used by valorous pirates who attacked 
merchant ships that travelled from Europe across the Atlantic to America and back at the 
beginning of the 18
th
 century. 
Getting tired of their difficult craft, the recent pirates sought to settle in foreign “quiet 
harbours”, where they lived out their days quietly and in prosperity. Cities-states of the 
Mediterranean even competed with each other, seeking to lure the retired corsairs with their 
untold riches to settle there. It also happened that some pirates paid with their stolen stuff, 
buying themselves the forgiveness of their fellow citizens. For example, in 1612 there was an 
event that could well be considered the first case of amnesty for criminal money. England has 
offered full amnesty to the pirates with the right of preservation of the property gained. Does 
it look like today's agreements offered to some states by major drug lords? 
If we go back to the 20
th
 century, it comes into view the figure of Meyer Lansky, who 
gave the transnational character to the phenomenon of legalization (laundering) of money 
obtained illegally. To avoid the fate of Alfonso Capone sentenced to 11 years in prison for tax 
evasion in 1931, Meyer Lansky tried to make it as difficult as possible for the law 
enforcement agencies. He believed reasonably that the tax charge can be brought only if the 
tax authorities reveal the appropriate funds
8
. Having used the Swiss Banking Act of 1934, 
introducing the concept of bank secrecy, Meyer Lansky acquired one of the Swiss banks to 
transfer and store money there obtained from illegal organization of gambling venues, 
distribution of drugs, exploitation of prostitution, extortion and other crimes. 
                                                          
7
 Smagina A.V. The dissertation of the Cand. Of Juridical Sciences. Legalization of criminal proceeds: a 
comparative analysis of criminal legislation of Russia and foreign countries. M. 2006, page 49. 
8
 Zubkov V.A., Osipov S.K. The Russian Federation in the international system of combating the legalization 
(laundering) of criminal income and financing of terrorism. 2-nd ed. M. 2007,page 19. 
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However, it was not only difficult for the tax authorities to track down money in the 
Swiss bank, but it was also problematic for M. Lansky himself to use it. Consequently, the 
money had to be in the United States again, wherefore it had to be “laundered” beforehand. 
In 1937, M. Lansky received a franchise for several gaming tables in the casino of 
Nacional Havana Hotel. Having took advantage of the corrupt regime in Cuba in the 1930s-
1950s, M. Lansky organized a transnational organized criminal gang. “Dirty money” from 
Florida was transferred to Havana, funds hidden in Switzerland were also transferred to 
Havana, where they were “laundered” through the casino and returned to the USA in the form 
of legitimate profits from foreign investments. 
But Meyer Lansky did not use the term “money-laundering” himself. This term was 
first used by The Guardian, the British newspaper in connection with the media coverage of 
hearings on the Watergate scandal. The US President Richard Nixon's re-election committee 
forwarded 200,000 US dollars to Mexico as donation, whereupon these funds were returned 
through a firm in Miami and used in the campaign
9
. In other words, in the second half of the 
twentieth century the very concept of “legalization” (laundering) of proceeds from crime was 
born. It undergoes various changes and continues to develop until today. 
 
1.2 Modern models of laundering of criminal proceeds 
 
In order to combat the laundering of proceeds from crime efficiently, it is necessary to 
be one step ahead of those who are interested in legalization of money. And there are many 
such stakeholders: from drug lords and arms dealers to individuals and even countries 
interested in the inflow of any capital, even illegal. 
Legitimization of criminal proceeds is a complex process, involving a variety of 
different operations performed by a variety of methods that are constantly being improved. 
Despite the huge variety of mechanisms and schemes of legalization, they are based 
essentially on one technology, which is based on the transformation of illegally received 
money (in cash and/or non-cash form) into legal income, that is, assets raising no suspicions 
of the legality of their origin. 
Despite the variety of legal interpretations of the “money-laundering” term, an 
analysis of the structure of the modern economic system also makes it possible to reveal the 
economic content of this concept fairly clearly. The money-laundering operation lies in the 
fact that money acquired illegally receives the form in the opinion of the state and society that 
completely or largely hides its true origin after the completion of this operation. Thus, in the 
                                                          
9
 Safire W. Safire’s New Political Dictionary. Random House. N.Y. 1993. P. 398 
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ideal scenario, the criminal proceeds become indistinguishable from legally obtained assets 
after completing the laundering procedure. 
In order to correctly classify money-laundering typologies, it is necessary to consider 
the stages of legalization of illegal incomes first, since different money-laundering typologies 
can be applied at different stages. 
In modern economic theory, there are several basic models of money-laundering, 
which can be divided into two groups: the first group of models is built on the basis of phases 
(phase models), the second is based on cyclical cash flows (circulating models). Let’s 
consider the mechanism of using banks within the framework of the main of these models in 
more detail.  
 
1.3 Phase models 
 
1.3.1 Two-phase model by P. Bernasconi 
 
According to this model, the main stages of legalization are money-laundering and 
return to circulation (recycling), which relate to laundering of the first and second degree. 
The first stage is laundering of money received directly from the commission of a 
crime
10
. The purpose of the first phase is to conceal the traces of a crime by transferring large 
amounts of cash into highly liquid and easily managed assets. First-degree laundering is 
carried out through short-term banking transactions, for example, the exchange of small bills 
for bills of larger denominations or currency exchange transactions. At this stage, the 
connection of money with the original crime is quite clearly visible; therefore this phase is the 
most risky for criminals. 
The second stage is represented by medium-term and long-term operations, through 
which previously laundered money is given visibility of that obtained from legitimate sources. 
The aim of the actions of criminals is to incorporate money laundered into the legal 
economy
11
 and to give it sensation of legality in the opinion of the state and society. At this 
stage, laundered funds are introduced into legal economic turnover through banks. 
The Bernasconi model distinguishes also between the countries of the main crime that 
has become a source of income and the countries of money-laundering. Criminal proceeds are 
transferred from the country where the main crime is committed to the money-laundering 
country through the banking system, and then they are reinvested back after the completion of 
                                                          
10
 La criminalite transfrontaliere: sophistications financieres et faiblesse judiciare/ P. Bernasconi// Les Cahiers 
de la securite interieure. 1995. № 19. 
11
 Bernasconi P. Finanzunterwelt. Zürich; Wiesbaden, 1988. P. 30. 
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the laundering procedure. At the same time, the following features are characteristic for the 
banking system of the country where money-laundering is carried out:  
–lack of compulsory accounting for banks; 
–possibility of opening anonymous bank accounts; 
–lack of obligation for banks to identify customers; 
–insufficient effectiveness of banking supervisory authorities; 
–no participation of a country in international cooperation on combating laundering of 
criminal proceeds. 
Thus, the banking system plays a key role in the model of P. Bernasconi, since initial 
placement of illegally obtained cash, electronic transfer of funds to the country of laundering 
and return of laundered capital to the owner occur through the banks. 
 
1.3.2 Three-phase model 
 
Each phase (stage) in this model has its own purpose and a set of ways to achieve the 
desired result. The model assumes the allocation of the following elements in a single process 
of legalization: placement, layering and integration
12
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Placement is the first stage of laundering of money received from illegal sources, the 
first step of money legalization and the weakest link in the process of money-laundering. 
                                                          
12
 Kozlov I.V. About stages of the process of legalization of criminal proceeds. M.:2007 
Figure 1 Three-phase model 
Stage 2, Layering 
Transfer of cash into 
non-cash form or 
other assets 
Intermediaries: 
- banks 
- casinos  
- pawnshops 
- foreign exchange 
offices 
- real estate agents  
 
Concealment of illegal 
sources of income through 
complex international 
transactions 
Intermediaries: 
- offshore banks 
- fly-by-night companies 
- illegal banks  
 
Ways: 
- capital transfer abroad 
- multiple transfers of funds 
 
Introduction of 
laundered funds in the 
legal market turnover 
Through investment in: 
- banking sector 
- hotel industry 
- casinos 
- restaurant business 
- non-banking credit 
institutions 
- pawnshops 
- etc.  
 
Stage 1, Placement 
Stage 3, Integration 
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Illegally obtained money can be relatively easily identified at this very stage. An important 
criterion of placement for criminals is anonymity, so the preference is given to the 
mechanisms and tools that ensure the fulfilment of this condition in the best way. 
There are various methods of placement, which, depending on the financial 
institutions used, can be grouped into the following categories: 
1. Placement through traditional financial institutions. 
2. Placement through non-traditional financial institutions. 
3. Placement through institutions of the non-financial sector. 
4. Placement outside the state
13
. 
Traditional financial institutions are engaged in ordinary financial business on the 
basis of a license or permit. These include banking and specialized non-banking financial and 
credit institutions (commercial banks, savings banks and associations, credit unions, mutual 
fund banks, pension funds, insurance companies, financial companies, investment funds) that 
are subordinated and managed by government regulators
14
. 
Non-banking financial institutions that actually provide banking services are called 
non-traditional. These include foreign currency exchanges, brokers of securities or precious 
metals, commodity brokers, casinos. Recently, these financial organizations have become 
increasingly used to launder illegally obtained incomes and to introduce them into the usual 
financial turnover. This is largely due to the fact that legislation aimed at combating money-
laundering is more developed and more effective in the banking sector, which limits the 
possibilities of launderers through the use of traditional financial institutions. 
Placement through the institutions of the non-financial sector. The following types of 
non-financial organizations are actively used to conceal the laundering of money obtained by 
criminal means: 
― institutions related to the entertainment industry; 
― institutions related to the automotive business; 
― retail, such as antique shops; 
― service companies;  
― other companies: construction companies.  
Placement outside the state. Placement of illegally obtained income abroad without the 
use of official institutions is carried out through physical exporting. 
                                                          
13
 Malyavin P.I. Ways and methods of laundering of the shadow capital. Belgorod, 2008. 
14
 Bekryashev A.K., Belozerov I.P. Shadow economy and economic crime. [Electronic resource] – URL: 
http://newasp.omskreg.ru/bekryash/intro.htm. 
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Physical export of money is carried out by various methods, among which the most 
typical are as follows: 
― concealed export of money by couriers (smuggling); 
― export of money in caches in vehicles or cargoes; 
― mailing; 
― underground banking systems. 
Analysis and allocation of various methods of laundering at the first stage of 
placement of illegal proceeds is of key importance in preventive activities to counteract illegal 
money-laundering. The more types of activities on potential laundering can be analysed and 
consolidated from a theoretical point of view, the more the range of activities of financial 
monitoring bodies is expanded in practical terms at this stage of most likely detection of 
illegal activities
15
. 
Layering is detachment of criminal proceeds from sources of their formation through a 
chain of financial transactions aimed at concealing the trace being traced. Layering aims to 
conceal the real sources of the funds origin and ensure the anonymity of owners of criminal 
assets. There is a mixture of illegal assets with the legal the same by form through financial 
transactions. 
Detection of a crime at an early stage is of fundamental importance, since if the 
placement of large amounts of money was successful and it was not discovered, then it 
becomes much more difficult to disclose further actions on money-laundering. Here, we need 
to consider some of the most well-known methods used for the layering operation. 
Transformation of cash into cash instruments. Once illegal incomes are successfully 
placed in financial institutions, they turn into cash instruments, such as checks, money 
transfers, bank checks, bonds and shares. Such a transfer facilitates the export of illegal 
proceeds from a country. 
Acquisition and sale of property. When a money launderer places money in the 
acquired property, the latter can be subsequently resold inside the country or exported and 
sold abroad. This leads to both complicating the search for a money launderer and to the great 
difficulties in finding and withdrawing illegally obtained property. 
Electronic transfer of funds is perhaps the most important of the layering methods. It 
provides criminals with such advantages as speed, distance, minimal traceability and high 
anonymity, provided huge total daily volume of transfers. 
Transfer of money to accounts of other firms (from the “A” firm to the “B” firm, from 
there to the “C” firm, etc.). Such a transfer, concealed by fraudulent deals or through self-
                                                          
15
 Gvozdeva D. Action gives rise to opposition/ D. Gvozdeva// Business lawyer.2007. №12. P. 16. 
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liquidation of firms, makes it possible to effectively hide the source of origin of financial 
funds
16
. 
Offshore territories with a preferential tax treatment, a weak system of financial 
control in the banking sector, a non-transparent ownership structure and absolute bank secrecy 
play an important role in carrying out the operations of the second phase. Fictitious firms are 
usually created and the traces of financial transactions are broken in such countries. The 
favourite places for such banking operations include in Europe: Andorra, Bulgaria, Campione 
d'Italia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Cyprus; in East Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore; 
in Latin America: Barbados, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Haiti
17
. 
Offshore banks are used at this stage with a view to withdraw funds from the direct 
control of the national banking regulatory and supervisory body, as well as national financial 
intelligence. 
Integration is a stage of the legitimization process directly aimed at giving a veneer of 
legality a criminally acquired fortune. The goal of the stage is consolidation of the assets 
disparate at the previous stages into some integrated form, convenient for use by the launderer 
(best in the form of an account in a first rank bank). During integration, laundered money is 
placed back into the legal economy and integrated into the financial system along with 
ordinary assets obtained legally. 
Let’s analyse the most known methods used in the integration process. 
Real estate sale. There are many ways to sell real estate, allowing you to return the 
laundered money back to the economy. For example, real estate can be bought by a sham 
corporation that uses illegal money. Revenue from the subsequent sale of this real estate is 
already considered legally earned income. Broken business can also be bought to make it look 
like the income is the result of the active operation of this business. 
Distortion of prices of foreign trade transactions. This method is effective for 
integrating illegal proceeds back into the domestic economy. There are at least two varieties 
of such schemes. The first one is associated with overstating the money imported to the 
country in the documents in order to justify investing the corresponding money in banks. The 
second one is connected with overstating the volume of exports. The purpose is to justify the 
receipt of the corresponding amounts from abroad. 
                                                          
16
 Investigation of crimes in the economy: Collection of methodical. recommendations of the Russian Ministry 
of the Interior. M., 2005, page 61.  [Electronic resource] – URL: http://www.dissercat.com/content/yazyk-
kriminalistiki-v-protokolakh-sledstvennykh-deistvii 
17
 Kerner H.-H., Dah E. Money Laundering. M .: International relations, 1996. P. 60. 
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Deals with underpricing. Examples include real estate transactions. A house is bought 
at a low price. After this, renovation is simulated, and the object is sold at a higher price. As a 
result, the external legal income is formed
18
. 
Transactions with overpricing. They are common in the exchange turnover, in 
transactions with works of art, at auctions. Things, the cost of which can only be determined 
conditionally are sold at a very high price. As a result, high real income is generated. 
Transfer pricing. It is common in export-import operations. Two contracts are drawn 
up: real and fictitious (with an inflated operation amount). Money is transferred to the 
intermediary firm, as a rule, registered in the offshore zone, under the fictitious contract. The 
difference between the real and fictitious price remains on the account of this firm as income. 
Use of bank accounts of a foreign or joint firm. The main goal is to manipulate the 
money in the form of loans, payment of letters of credit, payment of fees for consultations, 
lecturing, making payments under fake contracts or for fictitious services, paying salaries or 
commissions to individuals or companies. An example may be a case of recovery of 2.7 
million roubles from State Duma 
19
deputy Ilya Ponomarev in 2013.  
 
The Investigative Committee instituted a criminal case on embezzlement in a particularly 
large amount in relation to the Senior Vice-President of the Skolkovo Foundation Alexei 
Beltyukov. According to the investigation, during the period from February 2011 to February 
2012 Beltyukov handed 750 thousand US dollars to State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev from 
the funds of the Skolkovo Foundation illegally. 
According to the ICR, Beltiukov “tried to conceal embezzlement of such a large amount, 
having entered into contracts with Ilya Ponomarev on behalf of the fund”. In accordance with 
these contracts, Ponomarev had to give ten lectures in a number of cities in Russia for 300 
thousand US dollars, and to carry out research work for 450 thousand US dollars
20
. 
 
The three-phase model has been developed by the US Customs and is primarily 
designed to combat money-laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking. This is a very 
significant condition because: first, the retail drug trade is conducted solely for cash and, 
often, in small bills; and secondly, the use of cash in the US has always been limited due to 
the proliferation of non-cash methods of payments. A large amount of cash causes a lot of 
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suspicion in and of itself, so criminals need to get rid of it as quickly as possible by placing it 
on bank accounts, investing in securities or any other assets. An example of the US Federal 
Reserve System, which, in order to combat money-laundering from drug trafficking, 
constantly monitors cash turnover and applies economic measures to banks that receive and 
transfer to the Federal Reserve institution banknotes of one denomination within one business 
week, is indicative in this case
21
. 
Thus, within the framework of the basic model of criminal income legalization, banks 
are a key element of the money-laundering process. Placement of illegally received cash is 
conducted at the stage of placement, transfer of money is conducted at the stage of layering 
and investing in a legal economy is conducted at the stage of integration through banks. It is 
worth noting that banks can detect unusual behaviour of their clients at the stage of placement 
of illegally obtained cash only. Money-laundering operations become indistinguishable from 
real payments within the framework of economic contracts at the stage of layering and 
integration. 
 
1.3.3 Four-phase model 
 
This approach to the structuring of the laundering process is used by UN experts. The 
main stages of legalization are as follows: 
The first phase is release of cash and its transfer to bank accounts of front men who 
have their own accounts in banks. Such persons may be, for example, relatives of a criminal. 
At the same time, only one condition is complied with: intermediaries must have their own 
accounts in banks. At present, there is a tendency to seek intermediaries with outreach to 
international banks
22
. 
The second phase is distribution of funds through banking transactions and securities 
transactions. At this stage, a network of informants is created, who can inform law 
enforcement agencies of illegal circulation of the money supply. As foreign experience 
shows, distribution of cash is often carried out at foreign currency exchange offices, casinos 
and nightclubs. 
The third phase is concealment of traces of the crime committed. A money launderer 
has the following task: to take all measures to ensure that an outsider does not know where 
the money is received from and whom they are distributed to certain institutions or 
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organizations with. In order to accomplish this task, they usually carry out the following 
activities: 
–  use for opening accounts in banks remote from the crime scene and the place where 
criminals live; 
– money transfer from accounts of foreign firms accounts of criminals in the 
framework of fictitious economic contracts; 
–  use of an underground system of bank accounts. 
The fourth phase is integration of the money by investing laundered capital in legal 
economy. At this stage, criminal communities invest laundered capital in highly profitable 
spheres and business sectors. 
A key element of the model is the use of financial instruments and banking 
transactions, which actively use smurfing (organized purchase of easily convertible financial 
instruments) and structuring (payments in small amounts for different reasons to one bank 
account). 
 
1.4 Circulating models 
 
1.4.1 Model of circulation by A. Zund
23
 
 
 It compares separate phases of the movement of “water” during the circulation with 
the movement of money in the laundering process and distinguishes the following phases: 
– “Precipitation” (getting cash as a result of committing crimes): income is generated, 
as a result of various crimes, in the form of a large amount of cash in small bills; 
– “Absorption” (primary laundering): disparate amounts come into the hands of an 
organized criminal group for the purpose of primary laundering by acquiring foreign currency 
or exchanging banknotes of small denomination for banknotes of a larger denomination; 
– Formation of “groundwater” (accumulation): money is accumulated after 
preliminary laundering; 
– “Groundwater Runoff” (money preparation and transfer abroad): money is 
transferred abroad through banking transactions to a branch of a criminal group responsible 
for laundering, or to a firm specializing in the provision of such services (at a certain charge 
and at a certain risk); 
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– “Ponding” (preparation for laundering): funds that can come from different countries 
and different sources are accumulated in the country of laundering; 
– “Pumping Station” (introduction of money into a legal financial system): money is 
introduced through banks into the legal financial system. This is most convenient in countries 
where there are no requirements for the identification of clients by banks by purchasing 
financial assets (shares and other securities) and placing money on bank accounts;  
– “Treatment Facilities” (secondary laundering): is carried out with the participation of 
front men, fly-by-night firms 
24
and offshore companies/banks through a number of transit 
transactions; 
– Use (investment): funds are invested in medium and long-term assets, invested in the 
establishment of new companies or existing organizations. The goal of the stage is the final 
separation of funds from illegal sources of their origin and giving them legal status; 
– “Evaporation” (repatriation of profits): revenues after being made legitimate can be 
used to purchase foreign currency and transferred back to the country where the crime has 
been committed. Such return is usually made in the form of borrowed funds to affiliated 
companies of criminals or acquisition of an equity interest in the authorized capital of existing 
companies and establishment of new organizations involving non-residents; 
– Repeated “Precipitation” (new receipt of cash as a result of commission of crimes). 
This is the essence of the circulation: some part of money is used to finance further 
criminal activity; the other part is placed on the accounts of reputable banks or invested in the 
legal economy by investing in the world financial markets and acquiring equity interests in 
legal companies after laundering. 
 
1.4.2 The cyclical money-laundering model
25
 
 
In 1990, experts from the US Federal Reserve System developed a model that is a 
symbiosis of the three-phase money-laundering model and the circulation model
26
 by Zund. It 
includes 3 phases (placement, layering and integration), but flow of funds is not linear but 
cyclical in nature. Within this model, illegal proceeds can skip one or even two phases and be 
directed to finance current illegal activities or activities that do not require the use of legal 
means (bribes to officials, etc.) in accordance with the needs of a criminal group during the 
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course of laundering. That is, criminal proceeds do not necessarily have to go through all 
stages for money-laundering purposes, but can be used in an initial (not laundered) way to 
finance the current activities of criminals. 
The main instrument of the first phase is the conversion transactions of banks, money 
transfers through illegal money transfer channels and smuggling of cash into the country of 
laundering. Banks, gambling establishments, service companies, etc. are used in order to place 
criminal proceeds. The direction of further cash flows depends on the specific goals and 
capabilities of a criminal group. A weak spot of the model is that it does not reflect the fact of 
saving the part of the laundered funds and implies their further use in full for the needs of 
financing illegal activities. Ultimately, the possibility of further unimpeded use of funds 
obtained as a result of commission of an offense in a legal economy (rather than financing the 
current criminal activity) is the goal of money-laundering. The banking system is used at all 
stages of the legalization process in the cyclical money-laundering model, while a list of 
banking services that can be used to launder criminal proceeds is constantly expanding. 
 
1.4.3 Four-sector money-laundering model 
 
The four-sector money-laundering model was proposed in the early 1990s by Swiss 
economist K. Muller
27
. Sectors and related stages of laundering are identified within the 
framework of the model. 
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Identification criteria are as follows: legality/illegality of operations and a country of 
the main crime/country of money-laundering. 
The first sector is a country of the main crime/legality. Internal, preliminary 
laundering is carried out in this sector. The major instrument is currency exchange operations 
of banks. 
The second sector is a country of the main crime/illegality. Collection of pre-
laundered money into a pool and preparing them for smuggling are carried out in this sector. 
The third sector is a country of money-laundering/illegality. Preparations to introduce 
money into the legal financial system are carried out in this sector. 
The fourth sector is a country of money-laundering/legality. Concealing actions are 
carried out in the form of transfers, as well as banking products and services are widely used 
in this sector. 
Control of the banking sector by the state, may, if not stop, but at least significantly 
hinder money-laundering. For this purpose, K. Muller developed three possible scenarios
28
. 
– Absence of countermeasures in a country of committing a crime and money-
laundering: criminal proceeds can be transferred from Sector I to Sector IV, bypassing Sectors 
II and III. This is due to the passive attitude to the issue of money-laundering in a country of 
committing the main crime. Presence of laundered money in Sector IV indicates that the 
illegal origin of this money is no longer possible to establish in this case, since laundering has 
already taken place. 
– Declaring and identification in a country of committing the main crime and the 
absence of countermeasures in a country of laundering: criminals are forced to transfer money 
received by criminal means to a country of laundering using the channels of illegal delivery, 
bypassing the placement in bank accounts in a country of committing the crime. Since a 
country of laundering lacks requirements to banks in terms of client identification, the 
placement of illegally obtained cash in bank accounts is easy and virtually anonymous. 
– Declaring in a country of committing the crime and identification in a country of 
laundering: funds are transferred to a country of money-laundering without declaring, 
nevertheless, due to the need for identification in a country of laundering, they cannot be 
freely introduced in legal turnover. Criminals are forced to transfer money further to countries 
with milder bank requirements for identification. 
Within the framework of this model, the key parameter that determines the directions 
of flows and methods of money-laundering is the obligation of banks, through which 
placement and laundering of criminal capital are carried out, to identify their clients. At the 
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same time, the ideal situation for criminals is the situation where banks do not present 
requirements for client identification and there is an opportunity to open/hold an anonymous 
account. 
 
1.5 Analysis of the modern money-laundering models 
 
Examination of modern models, describing the money-laundering process, allows to 
conclude that the key element of the process of criminal proceeds legalization is the use of 
financial (and, above all, banking) system by criminals. At the same time, the main problem is 
the transfer of large amounts of cash received as a result of crimes into easily managed 
financial instruments
29
. These models are designed primarily to combat laundering of money 
received from drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, prostitution, etc. and, as a consequence, 
have the following common features: 
– models are based on the assumption that illegal incomes have the form of cash 
initially, and the laundering process starts with the placement of large amounts of cash in 
bank accounts; 
– use of cash in a country of laundering is limited due to historical traditions, as well 
as the development of modern payment systems and technologies; 
– money-laundering transactions are cyclical and are not the result of committing a 
single offense (for example, a one-time embezzlement of funds), but the result of constant 
criminal activity (for example, drug trafficking); 
– registration of companies in a country of committing the crime is preceded by a 
thorough verification procedure for their owners and managers, as well as the legitimacy of 
the sources of capital (the use of fly-by-night companies is difficult); 
– banks have the opportunity to minimize their own risks of being involved in money-
laundering schemes by refusing to establish contractual relations with suspicious clients/right 
to terminate a bank account or deposit agreement unilaterally/refuse to carry out a client's 
transaction if there are sufficient grounds to believe that the transaction purpose is money-
laundering; 
– system of supervisory and law enforcement agencies in cooperation with the 
financial regulatory and control bodies allows to monitor tax evasion and systematic 
transactions with large amounts of cash efficiently. 
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These conditions are extremely important, and failure to comply with at least one of 
them transforms the entire system substantially. This imposes significant restrictions on the 
possibility of using these models in order to develop methods for countering the laundering of 
criminal proceeds. 
These models manifest clearly one of the fundamental shortcomings of the modern 
fight against money-laundering, which consists in carrying out money-laundering operations 
by establishing new firms or creating situations where a new client applies to a credit 
organization for the purpose of laundering of criminal proceeds. In this case, there is a very 
high probability of underestimation of the fact that quite often a firm, which exists absolutely 
legally and has already an account with a bank and conducts real economic activity, will be 
used for money-laundering operations. This applies primarily to crimes such as illegal insider 
trading, tax offenses and embezzlement using official positions. 
 
1.5.1 Options of criminal proceeds laundering on the example of Russia 
 
The differences between the models of money-laundering are of fundamental 
importance for banks. The typology of these schemes is an important theoretical and practical 
task, because it depends on both: the choice of the counteraction strategy and the methods for 
managing the risk of involving a bank in the criminal proceeds legalization process. 
Under the current conditions, it is advisable to consider two options of the national 
model of criminal proceeds laundering when illegal incomes are in a form of cash and in the 
case of obtaining illegal proceeds by wire transfer. This differentiation is necessary, since it is 
the form of initial criminal incomes that largely determines the set of methods and ways for 
making them legitimate. Let’s consider the principle of action of these models in the practical 
plane based on the example of Russia. 
1. Illegal incomes in a form of cash. Cash in Russia was, and today is, the most 
preferable instrument of payment. According to the Bank of Russia, the share of cash in the 
amount of retail operations is more than 80.9%. This is despite the fact that the payment of 
wages to the population is mainly carried out by a non-cash method. Persistently high demand 
of the population and businesses for cash leads to an increase in their number in circulation 
annually
30
. 
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Unlike Western countries, it is not accepted to ask questions about the origin of money 
in Russia, as a consequence, large-scale transactions that are simply impossible in developed 
countries are made in cash. There, a large amount of cash is perceived as a definite sign of the 
illegality of the origin of money, but not in Russia. Modern conditions of the Russian 
economy make it possible to use cash almost in any amount with minimal risk to their owner 
both in the legal sector of the economy (in the real estate market, in the mergers and 
acquisitions market, in investment projects, etc.) and for corruption purposes, and also to pay 
for products and services in the shadow economy. Thus, one of the features of the Russian 
model of money-laundering is the possibility to use proceeds from crime in the legal sector of 
the economy directly in the form in which they were received, that is, in the form of cash. 
Therefore, criminals do not need to take risks and strive to transfer money to a non-cash form 
for money-laundering. 
The use of the banking system is necessary for criminals to withdraw capital abroad if 
there is no possibility to invest cash in the legal sector of the economy of the Russian 
Federation. Further actions of criminals are described by the classical three-phase money-
laundering model. Criminal money acquires a more or less legal form in the Russian 
Federation through the world market of loan capitals and operations in the legal sector of the 
economy of foreign countries, using systems of operations through offshore centres. After 
laundering, the funds can be placed on the accounts of respectable Western banks, invested in 
Graph 1 Source: Bank of Russia. Dynamics of the amount of cash in circulation (billions of roubles). 
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the development of legal business in any country in the world or returned to Russia, but only 
in the form of funds borrowed by companies of the legal sector or foreign investments. 
2. Illegal incomes in a non-cash form. Money-laundering has traditionally been 
associated among specialists in this field with illegal profits from street drug trafficking, 
which appears in the form of cash and laundered by placing it on accounts of financial 
institutions. However, money-laundering is associated not only with the specified types of 
criminal activity, and almost any crime in the economic sphere can serve as predicate. The 
main peculiarity of the money-laundering model of income received in a non-cash form is that 
legitimate activity is the source of illegal proceeds. Revenues acquire their illegal nature due 
to the illegality of their receipt by fraud, embezzlement, abuse of duties, etc. Thus, criminal 
money has a non-cash form initially, i.e. it is stolen from the victim's bank account. 
It is possible to distinguish specific areas of risk: 
– fraud and bankruptcy in the banking sector31; 
– pyramid schemes32; 
– embezzlement of budgetary funds33. 
Classical Western models do not take into account the possibility of obtaining illegal 
income in a non-cash form, although these problems are very urgent for Russia. When 
Russian analysts try to limit the legalization process with three main stages of the classical 
model, this area remains without due attention, which explains the low effectiveness of anti-
money-laundering measures in Russia. 
In this case, it is important to distinguish two main groups of operations: operations in 
the country of committing the crime and operations related to the withdrawal of capital 
outside the country for the money-laundering purposes. 
Having received income as a result of fraudulent actions or embezzlement of funds on 
the account in one of the banks of the Russian Federation (embezzlement of large amounts of 
money is made through electronic transfer, and not through physical removal of cash), 
criminals need to “separate” this money from the original crime. One of two main strategies 
can be used for this purpose: money is withdrawn abroad or withdrawn in cash after a series 
of transit operations using fly-by-night firms. Money cannot be left on the account in the 
domestic bank, as in the case of an investigation into the information received from banks, the 
chain of flow of funds across the country can be restored by proving the illegal origin of 
capital. Therefore, criminals need to withdraw money from the direct control of the national 
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monetary authorities or at least make the available capital anonymous by means of its transfer 
into cash. 
Cash-out transaction is implementation of financial schemes aimed at the transfer of 
non-cash funds on bank accounts in cash, in excess of the actual needs of an economic entity. 
In this case, criminals use one of the main characteristics of cash, which is its complete 
anonymity. However, matching of cash-out and money-laundering is far from always 
justified. This is justifiable only when cash-out in itself is a means of money-laundering, that 
is, illegally obtained income initially has a non-cash form, and cash-out allows you to break 
the documentary track of the money flow through the banking system channels and make the 
capital anonymous. At the same time, criminals are not afraid of a huge amount of cash, 
because, as has been shown earlier, it is not difficult to apply it in the legal economy of the 
Russian Federation. This corresponds already to the stage of integration (embezzlement of 
funds with putting them to the account corresponds to the stage of placement, cash-out 
corresponds to the stage of layering, and the use of cash correspondents to the stage of 
integration) in the three-phase model of money-laundering. 
An alternative option for using the banking system within the framework of the 
Russian money-laundering model is the withdrawal of capital abroad and laundering using 
offshore territories and operations involving non-residents. For example, the volume of 
suspicious transactions in Russia amounted to 531 million US dollars
34
 for three quarters of 
2016. In this case in 2016, the regulatory agency’s main focus was on transactions related to 
international cargo transportation and tourism, as well as the acquisition of rights to software 
and intellectual property. In addition, the Bank of Russia closely followed transactions with 
the use of judiciary writs of execution. A year earlier
35
, fraudsters used other methods of 
withdrawing assets, associated mainly with fraudulent securities and fictitious imports. 
 
1.6 Potential risks of money laundering through banking products 
 
Based on the analysis of the presented models describing the money-laundering 
process through the banking system, it is possible to draw conclusions about the degree of 
potential use of existing banking products for the purpose of legalization of criminal proceeds. 
In case of providing services to clients, which are legal entities, money transfers, cash 
services and clients’ transactions with non-issue securities can be recognized as the most risky 
for a bank from the likelihood perspective of involvement in the money-laundering processes. 
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Significantly less risk is incurred from collection of payments, letters of credit and bank 
guarantees, and the minimum risk stays with long-term deposits, salary projects and lending. 
In case of providing services to clients, which are individuals, current account 
transactions and short-term deposits, transactions with cash in foreign currency, bank cards 
and precious metals can be recognized as the most risky for a bank from the likelihood 
perspective of involvement in the money-laundering processes, and less risky are deposits, 
loans and custody services, while minimal risk is borne by transactions with registered bank 
cheques. 
In case of providing services to clients, which are credit institutions, a bank needs to 
show increased attention to transactions on loro (due to banks) and nostro (due from banks) 
accounts, banknote transactions and operations with precious metals; deposits and interbank 
loans are less risky, while REPO and SWAP transactions bear a minimal risk
36
. 
It is worth noting that the fact of the use of certain banking products by a client cannot 
be considered suspicious, since the main goal of banks is to receive profit from providing 
banking services to clients, but it becomes such only in case of client’s “abuse” by carrying 
out transactions that can be used for the purposes of legitimization of criminal incomes. 
Depending on the level of risk that is assigned to the client on the basis of an assessment of 
the use of certain banking products in conjunction with his organizational profile data, a bank 
must determine the necessary degree of verification and measures to minimize potential risks. 
As the analysis of best practices shows, today the state regulation and control bodies, 
international financial institutions and the banking community are intensifying their attention 
to the issues of preventing the use of national and global financial systems for the purpose of 
criminal proceeds laundering. Therefore, the policy of a modern bank should be aimed at 
preventing the use of its products for criminal purposes. A bank should strive to deal only 
with credible clients and the main task is to minimize their own risks by assessing the 
likelihood of involvement in the money-laundering operation
37
. 
Thus, the risk management system is one of the most important components of the 
organizational process of functioning of a modern commercial bank, and therefore shall be 
integrated into this process, based on a scientifically sound strategy and tactics, and 
implemented operationally. The importance of an integrated and adequate risk management 
system will only increase in the course of further integration of banks into the global financial 
system. 
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Second Chapter 
 
 
Fourth EU ML/TF Directive 
 
2.1 Global anti-money laundering groups 
 
 
The fight against money laundering received as a result of illegal business or criminal 
activities was and remains a key task of the law enforcement agencies of most developed and 
developing countries of the world. 
Initially, financial crimes were investigated by national law enforcement agencies 
(police, prosecutions offices, tax offices, etc.), however, over time, economic crime has 
become global, moving beyond certain countries, closely intertwining with similar criminal 
groups of other countries and continents. As a result, a project was launched to create a global 
institutional body to combat financial crimes, namely, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), which is by far the most influential structure in the world practice. 
The organization develops recommendations for partner countries, analyses and 
identifies global economic crimes in the global financial market, and conducts active 
analytical and journalistic activities. In addition, the Eurasian Group on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG), the Council of Europe Committee of 
Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of 
Terrorism (MONEYVAL), Egmont Group, the Financial Intelligence Unit are dealing with 
international economic crimes as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Eurasian Group on Combating 
Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism (EAG) is a 
regional group in the sort of FATF. 
The EAG includes nine states: 
Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The 
EAG is an associated member of the 
FATF. 
MONEYVAL 
A regional group in the sort of 
FATF, whereof mission is to 
spread the policy of 
international standards in the 
field of anti-money laundering 
and combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) in 
European countries. 
MONEYVAL is a monitoring 
body of the Council of Europe, 
and also has the status of an 
associate member of the FATF. 
The Egmont Group is a 
united body of 156 Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs). 
The Egmont Group provides 
a platform for the secure 
exchange of expertise and 
financial intelligence to 
combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing 
(ML/TF). 
Egmont Group has affiliates 
in EMEA, America, Asia and 
Pacific regions. 
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2.2 Impact of fourth EU ML/TF Directive 
 
A new edition of the EU Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Financing of 
Terrorism
38
 Directive came into force in Europe on June 26, 2015. Adoption of a new 
Directive has been a significant step, as it has influenced the evolution of AML/CFT 
standards in all 28 EU member states. Legislation in seven other candidate countries will 
gradually converge with the pan-European one within programmes on expansion of the 
European Union. 
The consequences of the Directive's adoption were felt also outside the EU. Legal 
entities and individuals carrying out certain operations in Europe – starting from opening 
correspondent accounts to buying real estate – faced new requirements for the identification 
and disclosure of information. These systemic effects will eventually lead to some degree of 
unification of legislation in different regions of the world. 
It is important to note the most significant innovations of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, which will not only affect the development of European legislation, but, probably, 
lay the foundation for best practices on a global scale. 
First of all, it is worth emphasizing the very nature of European directives. It would be 
wrong to equate them to national laws. Special hierarchy of laws and regulations have been 
adopted in the EU at the supranational level. Regulations, which are documents of direct 
application, are at its top. Directives that have indirect application are located a step below. 
Unlike the regulations, the directive establishes only the objectives of regulation and allows 
national governments to choose ways to achieve them. Therefore, firstly, directives usually 
never concentrate on details, but only lay down the basic principles of legal regulation. 
Secondly, a fairly long period of their incorporation into national legislation is envisaged for 
them. In particular, the Anti-Money Laundering Directive provisions were implemented in the 
law of the EU member states only on June 26, 2017. 
 
2.2.1 Cash payment restrictions 
 
Unlike national practice, when the existing law is gradually amended, often a new 
regulation (legislative instrument) replaces the old one completely in the European Union. So 
it happened with the AML/CFT Directive. However, although it was written “from scratch” 
officially, its content remained unchanged by approximately 70%. This is clearly seen on the 
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scale of the scope of regulation. Both the circle of predicate crimes and the circle of subjects 
of the Directive remained almost unchanged. The main changes here are of a point nature. 
Perhaps the most interesting is the presence of retail stores among the AML/CFT 
subjects (Article 2 Part 1 (3)(e))
39
. In particular, the AML/CFT requirements will continue to 
be followed by those sellers that accept cash in excess of 10,000 euros or pay a similar 
amount in cash to their suppliers. This is a rather interesting practice, but actually the impact 
of this requirement on the retail sector will be insignificant for two reasons. First, despite the 
lowering of the threshold amount (previously it was 15,000 euros, and the European 
Commission proposed to reduce it to 7,500 euros), it remains quite large. Thus, the 
requirement is mainly for sellers selling expensive products, such as cars, antiques, luxury 
products, etc. They have to take measures to check their customers properly, develop an 
internal control programme. Secondly, this requirement is irrelevant at all for many countries. 
Restrictions on cash payments have already been introduced in some EU countries. Almost in 
all cases, limits are set that do not exceed 10,000 euros (for example, 3,000 euros in Belgium, 
and 1,000 euros in France). 
The allowable amount of cash payments is 2,999 euros in Italy. Representatives of the 
European Commission assure that “cold” cash is a key tool for terrorists and criminals. 
However, the restriction on cash payments had a completely different goal in Italy and France 
initially: fighting tax evaders. 
Let’s consider the restrictions on the use of cash in the EU countries in more detail. 
EU Member States Cash Payment Limits, € Other relevant information 
Austria No limit – 
Belgium 3.000 Cash payments for real estate are prohibited. 
Fines from €250 to €225.000 
Bulgaria 2.500 Above this limit, transaction must be done 
through a bank even if it’s divided into multiple 
payments. If done in another currency, equivalent 
is determined by the Bulgarian National Bank 
Croatia  15.000 – 
Cyprus No limit – 
Czech Republic 14.000 The limit of coin is 50 pieces. Banknotes must be 
accepted without limitation, those that are 
damaged may be refused however 
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Denmark No limit However for any cash payments exceeding 
10,000 DKK (including VAT) – approx. €1,340, 
both the vendor and customer are responsible if 
the vendor does not pay taxes or VAT 
Estonia No limit Number of coins used for payments limited 50 at 
a time 
Finland No limit – 
France 1.000 €15.000 for non-resident taxpayers 
Germany No limit – 
Greece 500 – 
Hungary No limit for consumers Limit of €5.000 per month for legal persons 
Ireland No limit – 
Italy 2.999 Fines range from €3.000 to 40% of the amount 
paid. €15.000 fine for any payment over €50.000 
Latvia No limit – 
Lithuania 3.000 – 
Luxembourg No limit – 
Malta No limit – 
Netherlands No limit However some institutions have a duty to report 
identity of buyer for any unusual payments.  
Poland 15.000 Limit of €3.500 for legal persons 
Portugal 3.000 €10.000 for non-resident tax-payers 
Romania 2.250 – 
Slovakia 5.000 – 
Slovenia No limit – 
Spain 2.500 €15.000 for non-resident tax-payers 
Sweden No limit – 
United Kingdom No limit Businesses accepting cash payments of €10.000 
or more in exchange for goods are required to 
register with HMRC 
 
 
The table shows that some countries have no limit on the use of cash when paying for 
a product or service (Germany and Sweden), while the others have the maximum threshold so 
low that it seems absurd (500 euros in Greece). 
A study conducted by Deutsche Bank showed that the higher presence of cash in a 
country doesn’t mean the existence of a larger share of shadow economy. The following chart 
Table 1 Limit for cash payment in EU 
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proves that there is no direct correlation between the volume of cash turnover and the size of 
shadow economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, cash is used in large volumes in Germany and Austria, but the share of 
shadow economy is at a rather low level. The share of shadow economy is at an average level 
in Sweden, where the society has almost ceased to use cash. A set of different factors 
determine the level of shadow economy in each country. Famous German economist Friedrich 
Schneider claims that quality of institutions, the level of per capita income, tax level and 
morale determine the level of a shadow economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3 Source: Johannes Kepler University. Size of the shadow economy of 31 European countries in 2015 (in % of GDP) 
Graph 2 Source: Deutsche Bank Research. Share of cash payments in total number of payments in % (y-axis); 
shadow economy as % of official GDP (x-axis); data refers to 2014 unless otherwise indicated 
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Head of ECB’s currency management division, Doris Schneeberger, during the Future 
of Cash Conference, held April 11-12, 2016, in Paris stated, that there is “no statistically 
demonstrable link between crime and the use of cash”. 
The European Central Bank announced its decision to cancel the issue of a five 
hundred euro note in May, 2016. According to ECB President Mario Draghi, the abolition of 
the largest bill will help, above all, in the fight against money laundering and crime. Time will 
tell whether this is so. 
Directive 2015/849 applies to the organizers of online gambling also (Article 2, Part 1 
(3)(f), previously only physical casinos were affected thereby. This flaw was considered an 
annoying omission rather than a deliberate decision; therefore it was eliminated in the course 
of preparation of a new regulation. 
States still have the right to exempt some organizations from the obligations 
established by the Directive (Article 2, Part 3). This refers primarily to those institutions for 
which financial activity is not basic or financial services are provided only as additional to the 
basic service. The most common example of this kind is currency exchange for hotel guests. 
 
2.2.2 Сustomer due diligence measures 
 
Customer Due Diligence (CDD) occupies one of the central places in the text of the 
Directive predictably. However, not the very provisions of the CDD are of some interest, but 
the logic of regulation. Neutral regulation is adopted to the CDD procedure at the 
supranational level and in most European countries. In other words, no requirements for the 
due diligence process itself are established, but only its basic elements are fixed. According to 
the FATF Recommendations, there are five of them: customer identification (data collection), 
verification (validity check) based on documents and information, identification of a 
beneficial owner, assessment of business relationship objectives, monitoring in accordance 
with a risk profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROSPECT 
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CLIENT 
IDENTIFICATION 
CLIENT 
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CLIENT PROFILE 
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SoF/SoW 
SCREENING 
RISK FACTORS 
AND RATING 
 IDENTIFIED 
CLIENT 
Figure 3 The customer due diligence process 
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The Directive proceeds from the fact that the CDD can be conducted in any form. The 
main thing is that it facilitates actual risk reduction. At the same time, mitigation of one 
element (for example, lack of information verification) can be compensated by strengthening 
the others (monitoring). The absence of a personal presence by itself is no longer an 
unconditional factor of high risk. 
This approach has contributed to the emergence of fairly effective models of customer 
due diligence in Europe. For example, it is enough to submit a name and date of birth or a 
name and a place of residence to a bank to open an account in the UK, and if a financial 
institution can verify the validity of this information by two independent sources, the CDD is 
considered successful. Personal presence is required in case of doubt about the reliability of 
previously received information or the appearance of suspicions of ML/FT. In PayPal 
electronic payments system the client is considered to be fully identified if it remotely 
confirms the availability of a payment card issued by a regulated financial institution
40
. 
In virtue of the approach adopted, the customer due diligence is fixed in the Directive 
as a whole range of diverse solutions that vary from strengthened to simplified CDD. Specific 
procedures are not grouped according to strict criteria, but rather are located at one or another 
point of this continuum. 
Following up this logic, the complete exemption from the CDD is reserved in the 
Directive only for strictly specified cases, where the level of anonymity is essentially the same 
as cash payments. In particular, some tools based on e-cash with a balance and a monthly 
transaction amount of no more than 150 euros have been exempted from the CDD. Such 
products can be used to purchase goods and services only, they cannot be replenished 
anonymously, and the withdrawal of funds should not exceed 50 euros (Article 12). In the 
case of one-time transaction, the CDD is mandatory for a transaction exceeding 15,000 euros, 
a transfer of funds of 1,000 euros and more, a cash payment of more than 10,000 euros, and 
gambling gains of 2,000 euros and more (Article 11). 
Both existing and new accounts will be subject to comprehensive “due diligence”. Due 
to this, it is possible to identify in time accounts, which could potentially be used for illegal 
actions. Passive (unfavourable) companies and trusts, like those found in “Panama Papers”, 
will also undergo rigorous verification and harsh conditions. 
The approach of the European legislator to the CDD differs, for example, from the 
Russian practice, where the procedure-centred model dominates: a customer is formally 
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considered anonymous without taking a series of clearly prescribed steps, although his mobile 
phone number, location, pattern of transactions, data of payment cards issued thereto and so 
on are actually known. 
 
2.2.3 Beneficial Owners  
 
Strengthening of control over beneficial owners has become one of the innovations of 
FATF Recommendations 2012. However, in practice, it was more difficult to identify the 
beneficial owner than it seemed before. Difficulties do not only refer to trusts or offshore 
companies, where the ownership structure can be confused intentionally. Heads of small 
subsidiaries in large holding companies are often not just unfamiliar with the ultimate 
beneficiary, but have never met with him and certainly do not know his passport details. 
Long-standing business practice was not ready for high standards of transparency. 
It has been decided to deal with the problem at the lowest level in the European Union. 
Legal entities are obliged to store data on their beneficial owners by default throughout the 
EU. This information will also be transferred to the national registries of beneficial owners 
(Article 30, Part 3), which will be created on the basis of already existing registries of legal 
entities. 
Initially, it was assumed that the registries of beneficial owners and trusts cannot be 
publicly available for reasons of privacy protection. Since in some EU countries – for 
example, in Great Britain – trusts are widely used to solve, in essence, welfare issues: for 
example, protection of inheritance rights, interests of spouses and so on. As a result, a 
compromise solution has been formalised in the Directive: only those trusts whereof use 
entails “tax implications” should transfer data to the registries of beneficial owners (Article 
31, Part 4). 
However, on July 5, 2016, the European Commission published an offer document 
amending the 4ML Directive. These amendments continued the European Commission's 
statements that even more stringent restrictions are required to combat the financing of 
terrorism efficiently. 
In addition to measures aimed directly at combating the financing of terrorism, 
measures were also offered to increase a level of transparency in order to prevent money 
laundering and tax evasion. Such measures include ensuring the full public access to the 
registries of beneficial ownership of companies and business related trusts. 
Information on all other trusts, according to the offer of the European Commission, 
shall be entered in the national registries, and all persons having legitimate interest should 
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obtain access thereto. If a company poses a particular risk of its using for money laundering 
and tax evasion, the registry should contain data of beneficial owners that own at least 10% of 
the shares. This threshold requirement remains at the level of 25% for all other companies. 
Judith Sargentini from Greens/EFA, the Netherlands, stated that companies and 
complex structures being registered but not conducting any activities allow people to hide 
funds. The public registry of trusts and companies will provide such companies with 
transparency
41
. 
In its turn, the original version of Directive 4ML mentioned the requirement to enter 
only those trusts that create tax implications in the national registries of beneficial ownership. 
Information on beneficiaries of the remaining trusts should be submitted at the request of 
competent authorities. This exemption for trusts was made thanks to pressure made by the 
UK. Now, when the UK exits the EU, it was apparently decided to neglect its opinion in 
Brussels
42
. 
Also, access to the registries of beneficial owners will be received not only by law 
enforcement agencies, financial monitoring entities and stakeholders, for example, journalists, 
but also by ordinary EU citizens. 
 
2.2.4 Additional amendments to the 4ML Directive 
 
As other amendments to the 4ML Directive issued on July 5, 2016, the European 
Commission further proposed the following measures to prevent the use of the financial 
system for money laundering purposes: 
– containment of the risks of financing of terrorism related to virtual currencies. To 
prevent the use of virtual currencies for money laundering and financing of terrorism, the 
European Commission proposed to subordinate platforms for the exchange of virtual 
currencies and providers of virtual wallets to the provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive. Before exchanging the virtual currency for real, they will have to check their 
customers (conduct due diligence), which will put an end to anonymity of such transactions; 
– containment of the risks related to anonymous prepayment tools (for example, 
prepaid cards). The European Commission proposed to minimize the use of anonymous 
payments through prepaid cards, in particular, by verifying the identity of a buyer starting 
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from 150 euros instead of 250, and also expanding the range of requirements for customer 
verification
43
; 
– more thorough verification of third countries. The European Commission issued a 
document, containing a list of third countries with shortcomings in the field of combating of 
money laundering, at the end of September, 2016. It is planned to implement protection 
mechanisms with regard to these countries to prevent the use of the EU financial system for 
money laundering and financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).44 
Countries blacklisted by the European Commission are split into 3 groups: 
1. Third countries with a high level of risk which provided a written political 
commitment to address the identified shortcomings and developed an appropriate Action Plan 
with the FATF at a high level: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, Iraq, Laos, 
Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen. 
2. Third countries with a high level of risk which expressed political engagement to 
eliminate identified shortcomings and decided to seek technical assistance in the 
implementation of the FATF Action Plan at a high level: Iran. 
3. Third countries with a high level of risk that represent the current and significant 
risks associated with money laundering and financing of terrorism, which have repeatedly 
failed to correct the identified shortcomings: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea)
45
. 
Despite the proposals expressed by individual European deputies to expand the list, 
adding, in particular, Panama thereto, no significant changes have been made to the final 
version of the list. 
In compiling the list of countries posing a threat to the EU financial system, the 
European Commission was guided by the criteria contained in Directive 2015/849, as well as 
by all possible expert assessments of factors that make a certain country or jurisdiction at risk 
of crimes such as money laundering, financing of terrorism or other financial crimes. In 
particular, official documents of the FATF were taken into account. 
The main criteria considered by the European Commission in drawing up the list were 
as follows: 
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1. Institutional and legal framework of each country, taking into account four basic 
requirements: 
• criminal responsibility for money laundering and financing of terrorism; 
• customer due diligence; 
• record keeping; 
• suspicious transaction reports. 
2. Powers of national competent authorities in each country; 
3. Efficient application of measures to combat money laundering and the use of 
terrorism in each country. 
In addition, the results of the verification of countries by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) were taken into account. Reports of the FATF available to the public are 
published three times a year. One of them – «Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: an 
On-Going Process» – defines jurisdictions with significant shortcomings in the 
implementation of the Action Plan
46
 developed in conjunction with the FATF. 
Also, the FATF issues a Public Statement, which deals directly with jurisdictions
47
 
that refuse to cooperate and implement the AML/CFT standards. 
 
2.2.5 Public Officials  
 
Problems faced by subjects under supervision in the identification of public officials 
(PO) are similar to those related to monitoring of beneficial owners. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the possibility to solve them in the same way was discussed for several years: 
namely, to create state registers of PO, since it is the state that has access to the most update 
information on changes to personnel changes. Now the market players are forced to rely on 
the lists of PO drawn up by third parties, which are specialized companies. It is challenging to 
verify the quality of these lists, and all responsibility for their use rests with a subject of 
financial monitoring. 
Nevertheless, PO registers did not appear. Instead, the Directive slightly enlarges the 
list of persons falling into this category, in particular, members of governing bodies of ruling 
parties, members of auditing chambers and boards of directors of central banks are included 
here (Article 3, Paragraph 9). 
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As before, intensified monitoring should be extended not only to PO themselves, but 
also to members of their families (spouses, parents, children, spouses of children), as well as 
“close partners” (for example, business partners) (Article 23). In accordance with the FATF 
Recommendations, the Directive refers not only with foreign but also with national public 
officials
48
. 
In my opinion, the problem of PO detecting still requires a solution. Strengthening of 
anti-corruption work requires additional sources of information, without which financial 
institutions cannot minimize risks. 
 
2.3 Role and responsibilities of FIU and its anti-money laundering impact in 
Italy 
 
One of the major tasks of the control bodies in the economic sphere is to detect 
financial tracks left by criminals. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that 
illegal financial transactions have been transformed into complex intricate schemes that 
require the use of new improved tools for their detection currently. 
In this regard, organizations of international level recommended establishing 
specialized bodies to collect, analyse and disseminate information on signs of laundering of 
proceeds from crime. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) became such specialized bodies.  
In particular, the FATF, being an intergovernmental structure setting standards, as well 
as developing and implementing measures to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, indicates the need for countries to establish FIUs that would serve as national 
centres for collecting, analysing and reporting messages on suspicious transactions and other 
information related to potential opportunities for money laundering and financing of terrorism 
in its Recommendation 26. At the same time, it is recommended that the FIUs have 
permanent, direct or indirect access to financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information that is required for the proper fulfilment of their functions. 
The FATF recommends that countries introduce measures requiring financial 
institutions in the service sector and a range of professions to submit reports on their 
customers’ data and transactions and report any suspicious transactions to competent 
authorities. However, information transmitted by such sources is quite difficult to understand 
without its further analysis. To this end, the FIUs have been established as reliable, efficient 
systems for processing, analysing and disseminating the information received. 
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2.3.1 Egmont Group 
 
The Egmont Group, which is an association of financial intelligence units of a number 
of countries, in its definition, expressed the need to establish the FIU as a “central national 
body” based on the feasibility of creating a single centre in each country that would improve 
the collection of information, facilitated its processing and analysis on a unified basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provides strategic and administrative support to the HoFIU, the EC, the WGs, 
the Regional Groups, and assists with content management on the open areas 
of the ESW. The EGS is headed by the Executive Secretary whose appointment 
is endorsed by the HoFIU. 
An electronic communication system that provides an encrypted platform for 
members to communicate electronically and share financial intelligence, as 
well as other information of interest. Such information is able to be shared 
amongst Egmont Group members. The ESW is critical to the functioning of the 
Egmont Group. The HoFIU provide the mandate for the ESW, and approve and 
monitor its governance structure and policies. 
Establish the mandate and priorities of the organisation and make decisions on 
any developments affecting the group’s membership, structure, budget, and 
principles. The HoFIU may delegate specific authorities in order to expedite 
certain decisions and enhance effectiveness. 
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INTELLIGENCE UNITS (HoFIU) 
Governing Body 
 THE EGMONT COMMITTEE (EC) 
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  WORKING GROUPS (WGs) 
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  EGMONT GROUP SECURE WEB 
(ESW) REPRESENTATIVE 
Secure Communications 
  
THE EGMONT GROUP 
SECRETARIAT (EGS) 
Administrative, Strategic and 
Technical Support 
Serves as the consultation and coordination mechanism for the HoFIU, the 
Regional Groups and the Working Groups. Led by the Chair of the Egmont 
Group it is comprised of the Working Group Chairs, the Regional 
Representatives, the ESW Representative, and the Executive Secretary. 
The EC has responsibility for decision-making in areas delegated by the HoFIU. 
The EC is responsible for ensuring the horizontal and vertical cohesion of the 
work of the Egmont Group. 
Provide support to member FIUs in their respective regions and represent their 
members in the EC with regards to compliance matters, and other issues of 
importance. 
Created by the HoFIU upon the recommendation of the EC, their activities are 
mandated in line with the Egmont Group’s strategic plan. 
Figure 4 Source: egmontgroup.org. The structure of the Egmont Group 
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Today the major definitive requirements for the FIUs presented by the Egmont and the 
FATF groups are almost identical. Accordingly, the functions that define them are the same 
being as follows: acquisition, analysis and further transfer of the information disclosed. 
 
2.3.2 Responsabilities of the FIU 
 
With the adoption of a new edition of the FATF Recommendations, new 
responsibilities have been imposed on financial intelligence units (FIUs). Now they not only 
analyse current reports on suspicious transactions, but also deal with strategic analysis of 
challenges and threats
49
, coordinate a national risk assessment. The range of information 
available for financial intelligence units should be expanded for this purpose. They should 
gain access to information from centralized registers of banking and payment accounts, as 
well as to centralized databases that EU member states should create in order to identify the 
holders of banking and payment accounts. 
Pursuant to Directive 2015/849, the responsibility of the FIUs for the effectiveness of 
national AML/CFT treatment has increased as well. If earlier the main criterion of the quality 
of work was the number of investigations made and sentences on money laundering or 
financing of terrorism, now the list of parameters has greatly expanded. The financial 
intelligence units should assess the number of subjects under supervision, their approximate 
audience, and the market volumes. In addition, the share of suspicious transaction reports that 
led to real investigations is calculated, and a report on usefulness of the information obtained 
from them is sent to the entities of financial monitoring (Article 44, Part 2). 
The appearance of such requirements is not accidental. Tightening of the formal 
approach leads inevitably to a sharp increase in the number of reports on suspicious 
transactions. As a result, law enforcement agencies receive huge array of data, most of which 
are of no value. This increases the costs of the FIU itself, the economy as a whole, and, 
importantly, makes it difficult to identify real risks in itself. The European legislator
50
, 
following the FATF, draws the attention of governments to the fact that quality, and not the 
number of reports on suspicious transactions, should be on the first place. 
Financial information shall be disseminated both domestically and internationally. 
Since money laundering is often a global phenomenon, it is extremely important for the FIU 
to join forces with other national financial information intelligence units. 
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2.3.3 Typologies of FIUs 
 
All financial intelligence units are usually divided into four main types
51
: FIUs of an 
administrative type, which are either part of an administrative authority, or are subordinated to 
such authority, or are an independent administrative authority. The most common scheme is 
where the FIU operates within or under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance or the 
central bank of a country. The financial intelligence units of most EU countries belong to this 
type. 
FIUs of a law enforcement type are created within law enforcement agencies and 
represent the most effective method of forming a public authority with the appropriate law 
enforcement powers. 
FIUs of a judicial or prosecutorial type are created within the judicial branch of the 
state power and, more often, under the jurisdiction of prosecutions offices. They are typical 
for the European continental legal system, where public prosecutors are part of the judicial 
system, and their powers extend to investigative bodies. This allows them to lead criminal 
investigations and supervise them. 
FIUs of a “mixed” or “hybrid” type represent various combinations of the above types 
of the FIU organization in order to take advantage of several types at once. 
 
2.3.4 FIUs’ benefits and results on the example of Italy 
 
Important innovation in the operating principles of the Financial Intelligence is the 
mandatory presence of an officer of the National Financial Intelligence in a country with 
which there are close financial relationships. For example, there is a department based at the 
Financial Intelligence of Italy wherein employees of the Financial Intelligence of all European 
countries work, and likewise officers of the National Financial Intelligence of Italy are present 
in all countries of Europe
52
. 
There is a national body for counteracting financial and economic crime, namely the 
Financial Intelligence of Italy, and there is also an autonomous body, which is the Financial 
Intelligence Representative Office of the Bank of Italy in the Republic of Italy. The first one 
reports to the Minister of Economy of the country, and the second is subordinated to the 
Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Italy. 
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The tasks of financial intelligence are more extensive, they cover the control of 
activities of financial institutions, national companies, and individuals. The financial 
intelligence unit monitors electronic payment systems, tracking out and freezing “suspicious 
transactions” (financial control and control over the turnover of precious metals). 
In Italy the FIU reports to the Central Bank for the seizure of bank accounts of 
participants in the illegal process when a dubious financial transaction is identified
53
. 
The Central Bank notifies the national banks and financial institutions wherein 
suspicious bank accounts are placed. In Italy, they will block the account for 15 days. If the 
suspicions are confirmed, law enforcement agencies perform a detailed check on the basis of 
information provided by the FIU officers. 
If an extra-large-scale illegal financial transaction has been committed, the case will 
be investigated by the General Prosecutions Office, and moreover, the case will be monitored 
under the guidance of the FIU director personally. Large and medium-sized illegal operations 
are investigated by regional prosecutions offices. This operation is effective for persons who 
are residents of these countries. 
When identifying international financial and economic crimes in Italy, the FIU reports 
the available information to the Central Office of the Financial Intelligence of Italy. This unit, 
in close cooperation with the FATF, conducts an international investigation, which results in 
bringing to justice of all participants in illegal financial transactions by national law 
enforcement agencies. 
The statistical data of crimes solved are included in the annual reports of financial 
security organizations and cover indicators by the number of committed economic crimes 
(solved and under investigation), as well as the number of persons brought to justice and the 
amounts of funds that were returned to the legal financial turnover
54
. 
The number of applications for illegal financial transactions received by the FIU under 
the Bank of Italy is growing year after year. 
 
 
                                                          
53
 Kovalenko A.D. European measures on combating legalization of illegal incomes, page 3. 
54
[Electronic resource]– URL:uif.bancaditalia.it/homepage/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Reports received 64.601 71.758 82.428 101.065 
Percentage variations compared to the 
previous year, % 
– 11,1 14,9 22,6 
Table 2 Source: FIU 2016 Annual report 
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Based on these data, it can be concluded that the number of applications received by 
the FIU increased by 1.5 times in 2016 and the increase amounted to 156% compared to 
2013.
55
 Growing indicators testify to the increased vigilance and awareness of people and 
organizations. The overcoming of the threshold of 100,000 reports, more than doubled in the 
last six years (in 2011 there were 49.075), highlights not only the persistence of a growing 
trend starting from 2008, but also a progressive acceleration of the pace of growth (11%, 
15%, 23%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph shows that the largest number of applications for suspicious transactions 
was submitted by banks and post office, which amounted to 78,418 applications or 77.6% of 
the total number of applications. The contribution of other financial intermediaries was also 
significant and amounted to 11.1%. Among professionals, the largest number of applications 
for suspicious transactions comes from National Council of Notaries, lawyers, accounting 
experts and consulting firms which represent 94,2 % of the total amount of professionals. 
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Graph 4 Source: FIU 2016 Annual report 
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Breakdown by reporting category 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 64.601 71.758 82.428 101.065 
Money laundering 64.415 71.661 82.142 100.435 
Terrorism financing 131 93 273 619 
Financing of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation programs 
55 4 13 11 
 
 
Almost all applications received in 2016 concern suspicious transactions related to 
money laundering (100,435 out of 101,065). A significant increase in applications for 
financing of terrorism in connection with the escalation of terrorist activities by subjects 
associated with ISIL and the perception of this risk by economic operators can also be noted. 
The initial number of applications related to financing of terrorism amounted to 741 pieces, 
but some applications were reclassified during the analysis within the FIU and included in the 
Money laundering category later. In 2016, only 11 reported of suspicious transactions related 
to financing of weapons of mass destruction proliferation programmes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Source: FIU 2016 Annual report 
Table 4 Source: FIU 2016 Annual report 
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As for the territorial distribution of the applications, Lombardy plays a leading role 
here, which is confirmed by a significant increase in the contribution of this region both in 
absolute and relative terms (+50.2%). In general, almost all economically important regions 
of Italy have significantly increased the volume of reporting in relation to 2015 (Liguria: 
+28%, Emilia-Romagna: +25%, Piedmont: +24% and Veneto: +22%). 
It is also important to note a significant increase in the reporting of suspicious 
transactions (+87%) reported by Italian intermediaries working abroad. Switzerland is one of 
the most vigilant foreign countries (3.901) followed by the Principality of Monaco (389) and 
San Marino (240). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The normalized values on a provincial basis show that in the highest class, identifying 
a number of reports of more than 200 units, border provinces of Imperia, Como, Varese, 
Figure 5 Source: FIU 2016 Annual report 
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Verbano-Cusio-Ossola and Rimini are placed. Milan and Naples also emerge, where a large 
part of the reporting flow is concentrated, and Prato
56
. 
Despite the fact that Italy has a strong legal and organizational basis for combating 
money laundering and financing of terrorism, there is a large number of illegal incomes in the 
country. Organized crime is a historically widespread problem in Italy. 
It is worth paying attention to the fact that splitting of the financial intelligence agency 
is applicable to most countries of the united Europe. This principle of mutual control has 
shown its efficiency and relevance. However, the legislative principles are being improved, as 
are the methods of committing economic crimes. 
As a general principle, we can state the strengthening of the role of special services in 
the fight against financial and economic crimes. However, the process of fight is continuous, 
with the obligatory improvement of its methods. To prevent financial crimes efficiently and 
bring those responsible to justice, the monitoring bodies should use the latest and most 
advanced means in their work, and the punishment for economic crimes shall be severe and 
inevitable. 
The European Union is a unique association with a well-developed institution for 
countering the criminal origin money laundering, while significantly differing from an 
institution created in the United States, which is rightfully considered to be the first to combat 
money laundering at the state level. 
 
2.4 The fifth EU anti-money laundering Directive (5MLD) perspective 
 
While the EU member states continue to implement the provisions of the Fourth 
Directive, there is a debate regarding the development of the Fifth Directive at the EU level. 
In particular, the issue of data protection and personal safety of individuals whose data will be 
included in the central registries of beneficiaries remains topical. In order to study this issue in 
more detail, work on the Fifth Directive (5MLD) can be started in the near future. In addition, 
other important changes can be made to the Fifth Directive
57
. 
However, before the 5MLD Directive comes into force, negotiations between the 
European Council and the European Parliament should be held. Therefore, it is possible that 
the final text will be significantly different from the draft version. 
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Third Chapter 
 
 
Gaps of the Russian legislation in the  
sphere of money laundering and corruption 
 
3.1 About some issues of legal counteraction on money laundering 
 
Legislation of most countries is characterized by certain gaps in the contemporary 
world. This is due to a number of factors, which are based on various economic, political, 
ethnic, historical and other reasons. Anti-money laundering and anti-corruption legislation is 
the parts of the legislation of any country that has the biggest number of gaps. Russia is no 
exception in this matter. The reasons for the gaps of Russian legislation are that it developed 
in stages and chaotically. For its fairly long evolution of development, almost no attention 
was paid to the systematization of existing provisions, and only the creation of new ones was 
carried out. However, without the elimination of existing gaps in the legal counteraction to 
money laundering and corruption, the creation and application of new provisions will be 
ineffective. 
Consideration of issues of gaps in legal regulation can be found in the works by A.Ya. 
Prokhorenko, M.I. Melnik, B.V. Volzhenkina, A.N. Chashkin. Unfortunately, quite a few 
studies have been devoted to researching these gaps, most of which are superficial. A feature 
of most of the studies of anti-money laundering in Russia was that they were of a partial 
nature
58
. 
 
3.1.1 Ambiguous Russia 
 
Currently, Russian legislation in the field of combating the laundering of criminal 
proceeds lags far behind, does not correspond to international legal instruments. It should be 
understood that legalization (as a crime) originated in the United States of America, where a 
slightly different, in comparison with Russia, system for monitoring the income and 
expenditure of individuals and legal entities has been formed. 
In Russia, to prosecute for money laundering, for example, from drug trafficking, it is 
necessary first to establish the fact of receiving the money from the sale of drugs, and then 
                                                          
58
 Konovalov V.A. Vestnik OGU №11: About some problems of legal counteraction on corruption in 
Russia.M.2014, page 251. 
49 
 
catch the offender on its spending. At the same time, it is necessary that the expenditure has 
the purpose of “giving a legitimate form to the possession, use and disposal of the above 
monetary funds or other property”. The very few are detected and for scanty amounts as a 
result of such crimes. It is much easier to attract for such crimes in the United States: if there 
is only suspicion of such an act, law enforcement agencies can request a report on sources of 
income, compare them with expenses and all the undeclared spent amounts will be considered 
laundered criminal income. 
In the US, in order to dispose of property, in most cases it is necessary to explain the 
sources of origin of this property. Therefore, under such circumstances, owners of criminal 
proceeds try to make financial transactions and other deals in order to legitimate sources of 
origin of property. In Russia, basically, in order to spend your money, you do not need to 
prove to anyone that their receipt is legal
59
. 
Until recently, financial monitoring in the Russian Federation was carried out at a low 
level, and the money received as a result of the commission of crimes could be spent almost 
without hindrance, without hiding it in legally obtained incomes. However, the desire to 
increase investment attractiveness and development of international economic relations 
required strengthening the system of fiscal control and increasing the efficiency of the anti-
money laundering measured, including by criminal legal means. This necessitates the 
impeccable regulation and proper application of the provisions on responsibility for money 
laundering. 
The international legal instruments ratified by the Russian Federation have not yet 
been adequately developed in the legislation. For this reason, a number of anti-money 
laundering provisions and by-laws differ from international legal provisions in this area. This 
fact allows D.V. Rybakov
60
 and B.G. Tsedashiev
61
 say that due to the “corruption” of 
legislators, the legal regulations are designed by them so that the subjects of laundering avoid 
liability successfully, while investing criminal incomes in legal business.  
 
3.2 Role of the Russian Central Bank  
 
In his annual message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal 
Assembly, Vladimir Putin stressed that “it is necessary to increase transparency of the 
economy...  It is necessary to continue the principle-based and firm line on getting rid the 
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credit and financial system from all sorts of “laundry firms” or, as they say, “laundries”62. 
This statement was made in 2013 against a full-scale campaign launched by the Central Bank 
of the Russian Federation against credit institutions suspected of links with the shadow 
economy. 
Thus, only in the first half of 2017, the Central Bank revoked 34 licenses from the 
banks for various reasons, including due to non-compliance with the requirements of the 
legislation in the field of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(hereinafter referred to as AML/CFT). The most explosive was the revocation of the license 
from PJSC
63
 Bank Jugra. According to the Central Bank, as of July 1, 2017 Jugra held the 29
th
 
place in the banking system
64
 of Russia in terms of assets. According to the Banki.ru portal, 
the total amount of deposits of individuals in Jugra by the beginning of July, 2017 was 184.67 
billion roubles (2.64 billion euros). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Changes in law as a way to combat legalization of criminal proceeds 
 
In 2013, the AML/CFT legislation of the Russian Federation was supplemented by 
several regulations that were extremely important for the organization of this work in 
commercial banks. Thus, for example, on April 29, 2013, Regulation of the Bank of Russia 
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No.375P dated March 2, 2012 «On Requirements for Internal Control Rules of a Credit 
Institution for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism»65, came 
into force. In accordance with this subordinate regulation, credit institutions were required to 
bring their own system of AML/CFT internal corporate provisions in line with the 
requirements of the regulator. 
Such an internal corporate normative provision is designed to regulate the most 
important principles for the construction and operation of the AML/CFT system in a 
commercial bank. Previously, a subject of financial monitoring when issuing such a provision 
was obliged to agree a document with the AML/CFT official supervisory authority. At the 
same time, banks that have a license of a professional participant in the securities market 
agreed the rules of internal control both with their direct regulator, which was the Bank of 
Russia, and with the Federal Financial Markets Service
66
. According to the practice, the 
consequence of the difference in the approaches of the Bank of Russia, as well as the FFMS, 
to the understanding of the proper organization of the AML/CFT system and, accordingly, the 
requirements made on the basis of this understanding, was the lack of a uniform construction 
of the AML/CFT system in supervised commercial banks. 
In order to overcome this negative trend, the legislator has consistently taken a number 
of steps. First, at the end of 2011, the requirement of Law FZ-115
67
 On Mandatory 
Coordination of the Rules of Internal Control over Financial Monitoring of a Subject with a 
Controlling State Body was abolished
68
. Secondly, unified requirements to the rules of 
internal control and AML/CFT programmes and measures regulated by them were developed 
and approved. And finally, in July, 2013, the FFMS was abolished, and its functions were 
assigned to the Bank of Russia 
69
by the President of the Russian Federation. Thus, by mid-
2013, the necessary legislative conditions were created to build the most similar AML/CFT 
management systems in commercial banks that operate on the same principles and meet 
uniform requirements. At the same time, the Bank of Russia began to apply appropriate 
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punitive sanctions actively with respect to credit institutions that ignored the innovations of 
the legislation. 
 
3.2.2 Rosfinmonitoring
70
 
 
The Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring) updates and brings to 
the attention of commercial banks a list of legal entities and individuals in relation to which 
there is evidence of their involvement in extremist activities or terrorism on a regular basis
71
. 
Entering an individual or a legal entity in this list in accordance with the Law FZ-115 is the 
grounds for a credit institution to refuse opening a bank account, and the grounds for blocking 
an already opened account, if a transaction involving such an individual or a legal entity is 
detected. 
The Bank of Russia decided to adopt the experience of Rosfinmonitoring, and in 
September 2013, the regulator formed and brought to the attention of credit institutions a list 
of residents, being participants in foreign economic activities, in which activities the Bank of 
Russia revealed signs of illegal withdrawal of money from the Russian Federation, laundering 
of proceeds from crime, and financing of terrorism. In case of identifying individuals and 
legal entities among clients of a commercial bank included in this list, the Bank of Russia 
strongly recommends that such clients shall be denied in transactions. In addition, this list 
should be used by credit institutions to check potential clients when considering the issue of 
entering into a bank account agreement, as well as in assessing the objectives of their 
financial activities, financial position and reputation
72
. 
Thus, the Bank of Russia outlined a new approach in assisting banks in identifying 
individuals and legal entities associated with the shadow economy. The distribution of lists of 
individuals and legal entities whose acceptance for servicing is subject to increased legal risks 
for commercial banks appears to be a very effective AML/CFT course that needs to be 
developed. 
Moreover, it would be appropriate to grant credit institutions the right to create and 
distribute lists of individuals and legal entities that are found to be engaged in the conduct of 
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respective transactions independently. Unconditionally, this process should be centrally 
managed, therefore, for example, the Association of Russian Banks (ARB) could form such 
lists, and the Bank of Russia or Rosfinmonitoring could approve them and inform the credit 
institutions thereof. 
 
3.2.3 Importance of FZ-134 and FZ-115 
 
The most discussed regulatory document for the AML/CFT system was FZ-134 «On 
Making Amendments to Certain Legislative Instruments of the Russian Federation 
Concerning Counteraction to Unlawful Financial Transactions»73. This regulatory legal 
instrument has introduced a number of fundamental novelties in the national AML/CFT 
policy aimed at maximally brining it in line with generally recognized international provisions 
in this area, as well as eliminating existing gaps in Russian AML/CFT legislation. 
 Thus, Clause 14 of Article 7 of Federal Law 134 establishes the obligation of a client 
of a bank to provide, upon request of the latter, information and documents required for 
exercising control functions assigned by law. Previously, in accordance with FZ-134, a credit 
institution was obliged to request such information and documents, but the situation where a 
client refuses to provide them was not envisaged. Also, Law FZ-134 eliminated another gap: 
the legislator included tax crimes in the number of predicate (preceding laundering). 
In general, the changes introduced were very positive. For example, Clause 11 of 
Article 7 of Law FZ-115
74
, in a new wording, authorizes a credit institution to refuse to 
execute a client's order for a transaction if employees suspect that the transaction is being 
carried out for money laundering purposes (suspicious transaction). This provision 
significantly strengthened the repertoire of measures of commercial banks’ influence on a 
disreputable client. 
The lack of real counteraction to clients who regularly conduct suspicious transactions 
by commercial banks resulted from the imperfection of the AML/CFT legislation. Back in 
2005, the Central Bank of Russia published a letter demanding that commercial banks take 
measures to stop a client from suspicious transactions
75
. However, the AML/CFT legislation 
did not provide any leverage to a client on the part of a credit institution in a situation where a 
client ignores the bank's requests for providing explanations of the economic feasibility of the 
transactions conducted and supporting documents. Moreover, in accordance with Сlause 3 of 
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Article 845 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation
76
, a bank has no right to determine 
and control the directions of using the client's funds and establish other restrictions on his 
right to dispose of monetary funds at his own discretion
77
. Knowing this, people connected 
with the shadow economy, were free to conduct their transactions, not paying attention to the 
requirements of banks, while at the same time seriously damaging the business reputation of 
the latter and discrediting them in the opinion of law enforcement and state authorities. 
Currently, the above gap in the legislation has been eliminated by Law FZ-134. 
However, is it possible that the right granted to credit institutions become a duty? In the event 
that a commercial bank has sent a notice to Rosfinmonitoring about the commission of a 
suspicious transaction by a client and has not taken measures to refuse further operation of an 
account, the state supervisory authority should reasonably have the question of the reasons 
why the bank allows the transaction by a client, while its employees had suspicions that it was 
carried out for the purpose of laundering criminal proceeds or financing terrorism. In my 
opinion, a subordinate regulation or an information document of the Bank of Russia on the 
procedure for the use of the right to refuse a client to conduct a suspicious transaction by 
credit institutions, as well as further actions to be taken by a commercial bank with respect to 
a suspicious client in the case where such right is used is required. 
Another very useful novelty of Law FZ-134 is the emergence of the possibility for a 
credit institution to refuse to open a bank account in the presence of suspicions that the 
account is being opened for the purpose of laundering criminal proceeds and (or) financing 
terrorism. Previously, a bank could refuse to enter into a bank account agreement in the 
following cases: 
1) Availability of information about participation in extremist activity in relation to a 
potential client; 
2) Failure to provide the documents required for identification of a potential client, or 
submission of false documents;  
3) Absence of a legal entity at the address of its location. 
In this connection, a commercial bank had to open accounts for persons traditionally 
used by shadow businessmen in creating fly-by-night companies and other ways of laundering 
criminal proceeds: persons who cannot give clear explanations about the purposes of opening 
an account; persons acquiring financial products of a bank the value of which is clearly not 
correlated with the declared income or the position held (for example, students of educational 
institutions of secondary vocational education who register bank cards with a cash withdrawal 
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limit of at least 2 million roubles a month); obvious antisocial elements (for example, persons 
who are in a state of alcoholic or narcotic intoxication, having traces of beatings, tattoos, 
untidy appearance, etc.); and other subjects. 
Surely, the considered legal provision should be recognized as quite effective, as it 
allows a commercial bank already at the stage of considering a person's application for 
opening an account to cut off the majority of potentially suspicious customers. At the same 
time, it is obvious that the phrase “availability of suspicions” is by no means unambiguous 
and needs clarification. 
What are the specific criteria for the suspicion of a person the presence of which may 
lead to a refusal to open a bank account? Who should make a decision to refuse to open an 
account: a director of a credit institution, an employee of a customer service hall, or 
representatives of the economic security service? I think that it is also necessary to adopt a 
special subordinate regulation that clarifies the issues raised or entrusting the bank with the 
obligation to independently regulate the procedure for refusing to open an account with its 
own corporate regulations. 
Thus, the general revolutionary nature of Law FZ-134 and FZ-115 require clarification 
and additional regulation of individual provisions, but the need to adopt the legal rules 
contained therein has long been relevant. The need for reforming the AML/CFT system has 
been repeatedly stated by the banking community, and the changes introduced by Law FZ-
134 and FZ-115 meet the expectations of commercial banks in general. 
 
3.2.4 Increased control  
 
In addition, the Central Bank of Russia plans to stiffen the measures to fight for the 
disposal of the banking sector from questionable transactions through common clients. 
According to the recent explanations of the regulator, banks need to monitor carefully not 
only their customers, but also, if possible, inform Rosfinmonitoring of other’s and suspicious 
transactions. Comparing the data from different banks on the transactions conducted by the 
same clients, the financial intelligence and the Central Bank will be able to identify dishonest 
fighters with money laundering among bankers. In the situation when a client of one bank, 
while being a client of another bank, conducts transactions in the latter subject to mandatory 
control, information on such transactions, if it became known thereto, should be sent to 
Rosfinmonitoring by the first bank. 
Anti-laundering Law FZ-115 includes real estate transactions worth more than 3 
million roubles (43.5 k €), withdrawal from the account or transfer to the account of amounts 
56 
 
over 600 thousand roubles (8.5k €) , transfer to the accounts of individuals of more than 600 
thousand roubles, leasing transactions, interest-free loans, transfer of funds on behalf of a 
client of not a credit institution, etc. in a list of transactions subject to mandatory control
78
. 
The fact that this information will duplicate similar information from a bank wherein 
the transactions were conducted does not worry the authorities. Moreover, such an 
interpretation makes sense, namely to improve the fight against dubious transactions of bank 
clients. Duplication of information is not a problem at all, it is interesting to see cases when 
one bank has reported a known transaction or a deal of its client conducted in another bank, 
and the bank wherein this transaction was conducted has not. If a bank shows a significant 
number of transactions, which it has not reported to, this may become a reason to think about 
the quality of its operation within anti-laundering activities. And the insufficient quality of 
AML/CFT in a bank is one of the most common grounds to revoke a license from a bank. 
Pointing out the inconsistency of the broad interpretation of the law, the banking 
community most often cites a standard argument that an increase in anti-laundering load will 
increase the final cost of banking services for their clients. In addition, in their opinion, 
reporting the transactions of their clients conducted in other banks assumes legal risks. 
Basically, a bank reveals another's bank secrecy. If a client sues a bank for disclosure of 
information on the transaction conducted in another bank, there is a chance that he will win 
the case, because the law does not explicitly require reporting clients’ transactions conducted 
in other banks. 
 
3.2.5 «Сlosure of a bank account» issue 
 
The position of the Central Bank regarding suspicious transactions on transfer of funds 
upon closure of a bank account by a client remains disputed. The regulator's opinion reduces 
to the fact that when an account is closed, a transaction shall be conducted, even if a bank 
considers it suspicious from the point of view of the anti-laundering law. The attitude of the 
Bank of Russia regarding the rules for transferring funds when closing a bank account was 
published on the website of the Association of Russian Banks. Namely, the Central Bank 
indicates that the legislation does not contain any restrictions and prohibitions in terms of 
accounts whereto the balance of funds may be transferred upon the instruction of a client upon 
the termination of a bank account agreement. According to the Civil Code (CC), a bank 
account agreement is terminated upon an application of a client at any time, and a bank cannot 
limit this client's right. When closing an account, its owner has the right to dispose of the 
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remaining funds at his discretion, for example, transfer them to his account in another bank or 
to another person. At the same time, under the Law «On Combating Legalization 
(Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime and Financing of Terrorism» (FZ-115), a bank has the 
right to refuse to execute a client's order to conduct a transaction if suspicions about its 
illegality arise
79
. 
Up to now, banks adhere to the position that, having executed a client's order to close 
an account, they can deny him in conducting a suspicious transaction for transfer of funds. “It 
does not matter when the transfer is carried out, upon closing an account or not, in all cases a 
bank should be guided by the anti-laundering law and internal guidelines that are individual 
for each bank”, Alexander Yastrembsky80, a bank lawyer, said. 
The banking community is puzzled by the position of the Central Bank and sees no 
reason to change the existing practice. Despite the bewilderment of bankers, the position of 
the Bank of Russia is supported by Rosfinmonitoring as well. “Verification of compliance 
with the requirements of Law FZ-115 is required in any case, including when closing an 
account”, Rosfinmonitoring indicates. “However, there are really no legal grounds for not 
sending a payment, even in cases where it does not comply with Law FZ-115
81”. If a sending 
bank reveals that, by closing an account, a client has given an order for a suspicious 
transaction, it shall forward a notice to a receiving bank, which is already entitled to take 
measures. In my opinion, this is a serious gap that should be resolved at the legislative level, 
since a potential fraudster can easily transfer “dirty” money to another account for the purpose 
of further laundering upon closing a bank account. 
 
3.3 Importance of FATF under Russian realities  
 
Taking the way of strengthening the position of credit institutions in matters of 
countering clients, conducting suspicious transactions on a regular basis, the legislator 
reflected AML/CFT international legal standards in the legal system of the contemporary 
Russian State based on the common legislative and regulatory compliance practices of FATF 
member states (Financial Action Task Force on money laundering), an organization of 
international cooperation in the field of AML/CFT. The requirements formulated by FATF 
are combined in a legal instrument, which is commonly referred to as The Forty 
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Recommendations
82
 (despite the fact that these are requirements, and non-fulfilment of these 
“recommendations” entails the application of relevant international sanctions). 
Russia as a full member of FATF assumed an obligation to bring domestic legislation 
into conformity with The Forty Recommendations; therefore, in accordance with 
Recommendation No.10 of Law FZ-134 a fundamentally new term for the Russian 
legislation, namely a “beneficial owner” is introduced. A beneficial owner in a new edition of 
Law FZ-115 shall mean an individual who ultimately, directly or indirectly (through third 
parties) owns (has dominant participation of more than 25% of capital) a legal entity, or has 
the ability to control its activity. However, the legislator did not take any further steps beyond 
the definition of a beneficial owner and establishing the obligations of a credit institution to 
identify a beneficial owner
83
. 
At the same time, Recommendation No.10 requires FATF member countries to 
obligate commercial banks to refuse to open an account in the absence of information on a 
beneficial owner, and terminate the business relationship if an account has been already 
opened. Instead, the Russian legislator says that if a beneficial owner is not identified, as a 
result of taking measures to identify beneficial owners, then the sole executive body of a 
client can be recognized as such. 
Building an efficient AML/CFT system is one of the primary goals in strengthening 
Russia's financial security. Therefore, the need to develop a special academic financial and 
legal discipline, whereof subject would be the implementation of the AML/CFT legislation 
and the interaction of financial monitoring entities with representatives of the shadow 
economy, bona fide consumers of financial services, state supervisory bodies, law 
enforcement agencies, and international organizations, is obvious. At the same time, at least 
representatives of financial and economic specialties and lawyers studying the financial and 
banking law
84
, as well as law enforcement officers specializing in the exposure of economic 
crimes, should possess this knowledge. 
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3.4 Russian «legal» laundering scheme 
 
Imperfection of the Russian legislation in the fight against “dirty” money laundering is 
clearly reflected in the following scheme. In 2016, a new scheme for money laundering 
through court judgments, which is protected by law from all sides, was introduced in Russia. 
The Federal Bailiff Service 
85
(FBS) was the key element in the fraudulent chain. The essence 
of the scheme is that two legal entities – a resident and a non-resident – agree on the 
collection of a debt through arbitration courts or by entering into amicable agreements
86
. The 
plaintiff is a non-resident who demands to pay off a debt, and a resident-respondent agrees 
with his demand. Courts rule to recover from the debtor's account and issue an order of 
enforcement in this case unconditionally. A non-resident files it with the FBS, which begins 
enforcement proceedings, on a legal basis. 
Funds from a debtor’s bank account are debited to the account of the FBS and 
transferred to the recoverer's account in a foreign bank. Thus, money laundering is performed 
through the state institution, i.e. the FBS. According to the Bank of Russia, about 16 billion 
roubles, or more than 10% of the total volume of identified doubtful transactions for the year, 
were transferred to foreign accounts with the help of this scheme in 2016. In total, courts have 
issued judgments on claims (which have signs of such a scheme) for more than 37 billion 
roubles. The amounts of claims vary from 0.4 billion to 6 billion roubles. The scheme, using 
court judgments, is not new itself. It was the courts that were the key element of the so-called 
«Moldovan scheme» of embezzlement and withdrawal of funds from Russia widely used in 
2010-2013. In Moldova, a fictitious debt of the Russian commercial entity owed to a local 
company was filed against a local company that filed an application with the Moldovan court 
to issue a court order to collect the debt from a firm and from a frontman, being a Moldovan 
citizen, who acted as a solidary respondent. More than 20 billion US dollars has been 
withdrawn from Russia within the «Moldovan scheme»87. 
A new scheme is unique because engaging the bailiffs makes it virtually invulnerable. 
The scheme is protected from all sides by law and is still applied. Technically, this scheme 
does not violate the law; the courts and the FBS act strictly within their competence, and 
banks have no official reasons to consider a transaction as suspicious and counteract its 
conduct since a court judgment is involved
88
. The key problem is that courts lack authority to 
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verify the essence of transactions between a creditor and a debtor, as well as the existence of 
the activities of these companies. 
Based on the checks made by the Central Bank, the debtors do not exist at the 
indicated addresses, they do not carry out real activities, and the turnover on their accounts is 
insignificant in comparison with the amounts of debts. It is quite possible to identify them, 
basically. However, courts have no opportunity to verify the legality of debt collection and 
compare the amounts of recovery with the scale of the debtor's activities. The bailiffs at their 
own stage cannot also stop the fraudsters. The FBS does not have the authority to evaluate 
court judgments, but only enforces them.  
The next stage is the banks, but they cannot do anything. The order for the transfer of 
funds is received, in fact, not from a participant of the scheme, but from the state agency, 
namely the FBS, and the banks are not allowed to refuse it. In this case, banks are hostages of 
the situation, even if the signs of the transaction indicate that it can relate to the number of 
transactions for the withdrawal of assets abroad, they have no grounds to refuse to execute the 
court judgment. 
In order to ensure counteraction to the scheme within the applicable laws, the Bank of 
Russia should publish recommendations for credit institutions. As part of the implementation 
of their own internal control rules, banks should decide on the qualifications of transactions 
conducted within this recovery scheme as suspicious. At the same time, banks should show 
increased attention to all the transactions of such a client, use the right to reject other 
transactions and, in case of repeated rejection within a year, use the right to terminate account 
agreements. 
Another solution to the problem may be a reform to stiffen the requirements for the 
creation of arbitration courts. Arbitration courts should approach the solution of such issues in 
a more substantive way and examine how far the enforcement judgment may violate the rights 
of other creditors, that is, not satisfy the plaintiff's claims just formally only on the ground that 
the debtor is willing to repay its debt. In addition, recently a bill was introduced to the State 
Duma, introducing liability for arbitrators (both Russian and foreign) for abuse of power and 
commercial bribery. 
The accession in 2018 to a multilateral agreement on the automatic exchange of 
financial information provided for by the Uniform Financial Reporting Standard
89
 for tax 
purposes will enable Russia to combat off-shore economy and tax evasion more efficiently. 
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3.5 Gaps of legal counteraction against corruption in Russia 
 
The problem of corruption in Russia is becoming threatening. Corruption has become 
widespread in all branches of power, it affects all spheres of society. As to the level of 
corruption, Russia holds one of the leading places in the world in terms of the level of 
corruption. 
The crimes of public servants threaten the rule of law, human rights, disrupt morality 
of society, trust in power, the principles of public administration, equality and social justice. 
So far, a number of major anti-corruption laws and socially-significant regulations have not 
been adopted in Russia. As a result, many corrupt officials are “off the hook90”. The special 
danger of such crimes is due to the fact that they are committed by persons who, by the nature 
of their activities, are obliged to combat offenses and ensure law and order themselves. 
The fight against corruption in Russia acquired the features of a campaign: in pursuit 
of indicators, law enforcement agencies began to prosecute teachers of universities, doctors, 
other officials standing on the last steps of the modern “table of ranks” against the flourishing 
corruption in the top government echelons. This “strategy” causes both surprise and rejection 
of such priorities, significantly reducing the authority of the policy taken in the above area. 
Corruption in Russia is caused by a complex of problems in social, legal, economic 
and political spheres. But corruption is also largely determined by such factors as the 
peculiarities of the moral state and psychology of an individual. Therefore, in the conduct of 
social and economic, administrative reforms aimed at preventing corruption, criminal-legal 
opposition shall acquire essential significance. Pavel Yani remarked rightfully that no 
measures can compare by the strength of preventive influence with the fear of an official 
being exposed and punished
91
. 
One of the most important means of countering corruption crimes should be not so 
much the transparency of activities of officials, the development of civil society, as much as 
criminal legislation. And it is necessary to prioritize modification of dispositions of articles in 
accordance with current social and legal realities, eliminating contradictions between 
provisions of some articles, criminalizing all criminal legal manifestations of corruption over 
intensification of repression by toughening the sanctions of articles. Reference points in the 
improvement of criminal law should be law enforcement practice and provisions of 
international legal instruments. 
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The Federal Anti-Corruption Law of the Russian Federation provides very limited 
explanation of what is meant by corruption
92
. So, to qualify an act as corrupt, it is necessary 
that a corrupt official sells his authorities, that is, those legal authorities that belong directly to 
him. If he uses for his own purposes the authorities of another close person (colleagues at 
work, office, acquaintance, etc.) by using professional, moral, ethical, authoritative influence 
on this subject, then there is no corruption in such deeds. 
Moreover, according to the applicable laws, one cannot qualify the use of corruptly 
proper functions as corrupt acts. That is, we are talking about cases where, for example, the 
head delegates to his subordinate those functions that he did not have the right to delegate to 
him, and the latter committed corrupt acts for the time these functions belonged to him. The 
acts of both are illegal in this case, but not corrupt. A vivid example: the head of a bank 
delegates the functions of the bank manager to a clerk for the time of his vacation. 
It is important for the qualification of corruption acts to prove that the corrupt official 
acted against the interests of the country and society. This fact makes it difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to qualify acts as corrupt. The results of this difficulty are as follows: 
the exclusion of liability with implicit signs of the committed, the possibility of subjective 
interpretation of the “legitimate interests of society and the state” category by law 
enforcement agencies and the court
93
. 
Having considered some peculiarities and shortcomings of the qualification of acts as 
corrupt, I would like to consider the differentiation of corruption from related close offenses. 
We can trace two approaches to the legal understanding of similar phenomena in the 
Russian anti-corruption legislation. First of all, it is actually corruption itself, and secondly, it 
is a violation of anti-corruption standards by a person, that is, unified rules, restrictions, 
thresholds of rights established for a certain area of activity. 
A feature of the procedural application of the anti-corruption legal array is that law 
enforcement agencies are allowed to use it in the “extended” investigation only when the 
qualifying signs of corruption are clearly traced. Moreover, another important feature of the 
qualification of near-corruption offenses and corruption is that the investigation and search 
system cannot be used if disciplinary near-corruption offenses are detected. Such an 
investigation is only internal. Often, individuals are unfairly accused and dismissed, as a 
result of such investigations, and sometimes the unidentified harm in this type of investigation 
is so great that ordinary dismissal is not an appropriate sufficient form of punishment. It is 
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possible to apply the investigation and search actions only when administrative violations 
with a clearly defined corruption composition of the offense are established. 
The fight against corruption in the system of investigation and search actions (ISA) is 
disclosed in Law FZ-273 as a type of activity for the prevention, detection, investigation of 
corruption offenses. However, there are serious problems in the application of such an anti-
corruption system on a practical level. Let's consider some of them. 
The basis for ISA is information about a crime committed (Investigation and Search 
Actions Federal Law)
94
. However, the law does not indicate the need to perform a search 
function under the circumstances. Unfortunately, there is no current monitoring programme 
for corruptly dangerous units or even monitoring the activities of individual officials in 
Russia, which, of course, significantly reduces the efficiency of using this system and 
counteracting the plundering of state money and the abuse of their position by officials. 
Currently, despite the existence of a sufficiently extensive system of law enforcement and 
internal control bodies, only a single state body can legally exercise search powers in the fight 
against corruption, which is the bodies of the Federal Security Service
95
. The Federal Security 
Service Federal Law notes that the FSS can take search actions not only to counter foreign 
intelligence, but also to combat all criminality, including corruption. 
ISA do not provide for personal search of things, persons, transport, forcible bringing 
to an agency of inquiry or preliminary investigation of persons suspected of committing a 
crime, even if there are solid facts about their involvement in the crime. This gap in the legal 
regulation of ISA becomes especially relevant in cases where it is necessary to conduct a 
personal search of a suspect of an offense, for example, to identify a bribe that has just been 
given, or which may still be near such a person. It is quite common practice when law 
enforcement officers were accused of abuse of their powers on such or similar basis. 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation provides that everyone has the right to 
personal inviolability. Although, the provisions of the Constitution also provide for the 
possibility to be guided by federal legislation when deciding on the issue of personal search, 
inspection of things, transportation, etc. Access to information that requires court 
authorization is prohibited in the ISA regime. This is information that constitutes a certain 
kind of secret. Anti-corruption efficiency of law enforcement bodies applying ISA will 
continue to be rather low in the future until the relevant procedure for their access to 
information will not be simplified
96
. 
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An analysis of Article 59 of the Public Service Federal Law allows to conclude that 
the legislator has split all corruption offenses committed by state or municipal employees into 
two groups: serious offences, which entails dismissal from the public service in connection 
with loss of confidence, and others wherefore penalties can be applied not related to the 
termination of employment relations. 
When applying disciplinary actions, an employer shall take into account the 
requirements provided for in Article 59 of the Public Service Federal Law which are as 
follows: the nature of a corruption offense committed by a public servant
97
, its severity, 
circumstances whereunder it was committed, observance of other restrictions and prohibitions 
by a public servant, requirements for prevention or resolution of a conflict of interests and the 
performance of his duties established for the anti-corruption purpose. These circumstances 
should be taken into account also by prosecutors when applying prosecutorial response 
actions in order to eliminate violations of anti-corruption legislation. 
The practice of public prosecutor’s supervision shows that there are problems of 
dismissal in connection with the loss of confidence due to a failure to take measures to resolve 
conflicts of interest in the service, a failure to provide information on incomes, property and 
property liabilities by the heads of local administrations appointed to a position under a 
contract entered into according to results of the competition. 
Based on literal interpretation of Part 11 of Article 37 of the Federal Law of the 
Russian Federation On General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government in 
the Russian Federation, dismissal of the heads of local administrations is possible only for 
violation of the legislative requirements that prohibit the implementation of entrepreneurial 
activities, as well as other paid activities and being a member in governing bodies, guardian or 
supervisory boards of foreign non-profit non-governmental organizations and their structural 
units operating in the Russian Federation. 
The possibility of dismissal of the heads of administration in connection with the loss 
of confidence due to a failure to take measures in resolving conflicts of interest in the service, 
a failure to provide information on incomes, property and property liabilities is not provided 
for by law at all
98
. 
Summing up the consideration of the indicated problem, it should be noted that in 
some cases, the regulation of issues of applying the disciplinary responsibility of municipal 
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employees leads to a violation of the principle of the inevitability of responsibility for 
committing corruption violations and is subject to adjustment. 
Currently in Russia, positive references, assistance in employment, study cannot be 
regarded as an object of bribery or commercial bribery, since the benefit of non-monetary 
value cannot be regarded as a bribe under the applicable Criminal Code of the Russian 
Federation. 
In view of the foregoing, I believe that not only money, securities, other property, 
benefits, services or work of monetary value should be consolidated as a single subject of 
bribery, but also various benefits and services of non-monetary value.  
 
3.6 Deficiencies of the Russian Land Code
99
 
 
Having allowed the alienation of land into private ownership, the legislator of the 
Russian Federation counted on the conscientious, lawful behaviour of an official obliged to 
act for the benefit of society, making decisions about the fair distribution of the public 
domain, which is land. But often this duty contradicts the possibility of gaining the benefit by 
an official, because as a rule, there are always several claimants for each plot of land, 
presenting (openly and privately) various arguments by their content. In essence, a market 
situation develops for an official: there is a commodity, which is a decision to provide land, 
there is demand and various “prices” of demand proposed by buyers. 
The very federal land legislation, which is extremely complicated and confusing, 
contributes to this phenomenon in no small measure. Fourteen years have passed since the 
Land Code of the Russian Federation entered into force, and so many amendments were made 
thereto. There are legislative instruments regulating land legal relations, along with the Land 
Code, but, unfortunately, despite such a long period of formation of land legislation in the 
Russian Federation, it is not devoid of many shortcomings up to the present time. 
Uncertain or contradictory legal instruments in the field of land use facilitate officials 
to abuse authority to manage land plots. Upon enforcement, due to the absence of a direct 
legislative prohibition, officials are not limited in interpreting the statutory provisions 
depending on their interests in the issue to be resolved, i.e. the land legislation contains 
questionable provisions that stimulate the speculative actions of the concerned parties
100
. 
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Thus, Article 30 of the Land Code provides for the provision for construction from 
lands in state or municipal ownership, with the preliminary agreement of the location of 
facilities to be constructed. The procedure for making a decision on prior agreement of the 
location of a facility established by the Code provision is the most non-transparent and 
potentially corrupt scheme for granting land plots in the Land Code, as it creates statutory 
prerequisites for the municipality to abuse its right. The application of this procedure actually 
guarantees to a specific “selected” person the acquisition of a land plot, since by virtue of 
Clause 8 of Article 31 of the Land Code a decision on preliminary agreement of the location 
of a facility is the basis for the subsequent decision to grant a land plot for construction and is 
valid for three years. While applying the procedure for the provision of land without prior 
approval of the location of a facility, which provides for bidding, the consequences for a 
particular person are unpredictable. 
In accordance with Clause 12 of Article 30 of the Land Code the local self-
government bodies have the right to establish a list of cases where the granting of land plots 
that are in municipal ownership, which they have the right to dispose of in accordance with 
the land legislation, is carried out exclusively by tenders. At the same time, the land 
legislation contains no specific grounds and conditions for applying the procedures for 
granting land plots with prior agreement of the location of facilities and without, and the 
responsibilities of local government bodies are not provided for, i.e., the decision on the form 
of granting a land plot is taken by the municipality, or rather by an official at his own 
discretion. 
According to Clause 3 of Article 31 of the Land Code the local self-government 
bodies should inform the population about possible or forthcoming provision of a land plot for 
construction. Citizens, public organizations (associations), religious organizations and 
territorial public self-government bodies have the right to participate in solving issues 
affecting the interests of the population, including through the purchase of land plots for state 
and municipal needs and the provision of these land plots for construction.  
However, the terms for expressing their opinion by the concerned parties have not 
been determined by law, nor has the algorithm of actions of local self-government bodies 
been defined when objections are raised regarding the proposed construction
101
. Again, there 
are grounds for alternative behaviour of officials: accepting or ignoring the views of 
stakeholders. It does not follow unambiguously from the meaning of the Land Code that this 
provision is aimed at protecting the population, but it gives an official the opportunity, with 
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reference to the receipt of an objection, to refuse to make a decision on granting a land plot 
upon receipt of more favourable offers. 
In order to exclude the facts of alternative law enforcement, it is necessary to abolish 
the procedure for granting a land plot with a preliminary agreement on the location of a 
facility. 
Legislation does not also explicitly prohibit the transfer of rights when applying this 
procedure. However, an application can be filed by a person who wishes to receive money 
from a commercial transaction using a previously “agreed” land plot subsequently. Thus, the 
procedure for preliminary agreement of the location of a facility can be used by selected 
individuals for enrichment without any financial costs. The legislation does not provide any 
responsibility for such actions. 
Local government is the closest level of authority to people. Due to the basic 
principles of the land legislation, local government bodies shall own, use, dispose of 
municipal land in the interests of the development of municipal formation and social and 
economic interests of their citizens. Effective use of land is one of the own sources of local 
budget formation designed to provide tasks and functions related to the subjects of local self-
government. Quality of life of the population of a municipal formation can be improved at the 
expense of budgetary funds. At the same time, one of the main mechanisms for replenishing 
the revenue side of a local budget using the right to dispose of land plots granted to 
municipalities is the use of auction procedures (bidding/tenders), the use of which can bring 
million revenues to a local budget. 
However, the applicable land legislation of the Russian Federation contains the 
requirement to provide land plots exclusively by bidding only in relation to land plots for 
housing construction. In the case of provision of land plots with the preliminary agreement of 
the location of a facility, as noted above, the bidding is not conducted, i.е., the plot is 
provided on the most favourable terms for the developer. It is not hard to guess that only those 
selected and close to officials can use this scheme, which is essentially corrupt. After all, land 
plots could be transferred into ownership by selling it at tenders, on which, as a rule, the 
declared value increases many-fold. 
Absence of tenders is permitted by the land legislation also in cases where land is 
provided for individual housing construction, personal subsidiary economy, for the 
organization of agricultural enterprise, etc. At the same time, there are many people wishing 
to obtain land for these purposes, especially in urban localities, which indicates that the plots 
are in demand, and the exercise of rights thereto, if there are bidding procedures, would entail 
significant revenues to the budget. 
68 
 
Thus, it is necessary to abolish legally the allocation of land without the use of bidding 
procedures or clearly establish exceptional cases of granting land without using it.  
Due to legal gaps in the Article 36 of the Land Code, there was also a practice of 
acquiring rights to land plots under the destroyed buildings, constructions, as a rule, having a 
small area. The price of such illiquid real estate is accordingly low, and it is acquired only 
with the purpose of subsequent registration of rights to the land plot located below it, the price 
of which is higher than the value of the destroyed facility. After the acquisition of rights to the 
land plot, the destroyed facility is not restored by the owner, as a rule. 
Currently, there is no direct legislative prohibition on carrying out such actions, which 
allows officials who facilitate the commission of these actions to become unjustly rich, while 
reducing the reserves of municipal property
102
. 
Quite a lot of questions are caused by the assessment of land plots carried out for the 
purpose of bidding, since the cost of comparable plots is very different. Often, the assessment 
of a land plot, as well as all real estate sold by the municipality, is conducted according to a 
unspoken arrangement of local government bodies with an appraiser that underestimates the 
cost of the site. The result of such actions is inflicting damage to the budget. 
In view of the above, the assessment shall be carried out by a truly independent expert 
organization in order to determine the real market price of land plots. The way-out can be the 
legislative recognition of a list of institutions accredited in the corresponding field that will 
conduct such an assessment. If this is not the way to eradicate abuses in full, then at least it 
should significantly reduce the amount of damage caused to the budget. 
Gaps are also contained in the legislation regulating the bidding. Thus, in accordance 
with Clause 11 of Article 38 of the Land Code, a bidding process organizer has the right to 
refuse to conduct the bidding not later than fifteen days before the day of the bidding. As the 
practice of public prosecutor’s supervision shows – local government bodies often resort to 
this provision of the Land Code in case of receipt of applications from “favourable” persons 
or when persons undesired by officials are registered to participate in the bidding. 
Legislation does not determine the grounds for making this decision, regulating only 
the timing of making thereof. Thus, the bidding can be cancelled without an explanation of 
the reasons. Subsequently, other ways of providing the land plot are being sought. 
A legal gap exists in the provisions that establish the grounds for recognizing the 
bidding as void. At the same time, such grounds are often used in order to preserve the 
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interests of selected persons. Thus, in case of expiration of the decision on the cancellation of 
the bidding, the person in the interests of whom the bidding was declared, regardless of the 
number of participants, declares the price step by step, which is several times greater than the 
real market value of the land plot, which, surely, he does not intend to pay. His real intentions 
are not to allow other participants of the bidding to win (and consequently, to gain the rights 
to land). Becoming the winning bidder, he subsequently refuses to sign the bidding protocol, 
which entails the consequences set forth in Clause 5, Article 448 of the Land Code, which is 
loss of deposit (usually an insignificant amount). 
The bidding process organizer has the right, and not the obligation to make a decision 
on the holding of repeated bidding. In order to avoid undesirable consequences for concerned 
persons, the land plot can be transferred to the “selected” person using another procedure that 
excludes the bidding, fortunately, the land legislation contains a lot of such schemes, based, in 
fact, on the law
103
. 
The land legislation allows for a change in the permitted use of land, which is also 
used by municipalities. Thus, as already noted, in addition to the widespread use of various 
schemes for the registration of land plots for construction through preliminary agreement of 
the location of a facility by municipalities, they use schemes to change the permitted use of 
land for the purpose of avoiding significant amounts of payment for land. For example, the 
right to a land plot for the placement of sports facilities is acquired, for which, by virtue of the 
law, a decreasing coefficient of payment for land is established, and later the permitted use of 
the site is changed for placing commercial properties. 
Law enforcement officers, rights holders, monitoring bodies are forced to eliminate in 
court legal gaps in the land legislation that promote the emergence of corruption schemes. 
Corruption in the sphere of land legal relations has recently been very much discussed 
in the mass media of the Russian Federation, at the federal level its eradication is linked to the 
creation of an open access to an information resource
104
, which will reduce the possibility of 
using various shadow schemes in view of the public nature of the process. 
However, it is impossible to suppress the actions of officials allowing them to gain 
benefits at the expense and the detriment of society, without changing the very land 
legislation. 
The suppression of the use of corrupt schemes, i.e. prevention of corruption, is 
possible only through the establishment of legislative prohibitions. In order to exclude the 
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facts of abuse their right by officials, protect the interests of individuals and legal entities, I 
think it is necessary to do the following on a legislative level: 
- to establish a closed list of permitted use of land plots that are to be provided without 
bidding procedures (for example, for the placement of utilities, transport, social 
infrastructure); 
- to provide for the possibility of selling the rights to land plots only with the use of 
bidding procedures, namely electronic trading; 
- to exclude the procedure of preliminary agreement of the facility location; 
- to determine a list of accredited institutions for conducting land assessment at the 
federal level; 
- to prohibit the change in the permitted use of the land plot, entailing a change in its 
value; 
- to create a single open information resource about land plots. 
 
3.7 Congeniality of  legislative problems 
 
Having analysed the anti-laundering gaps, I would like to note the general features of 
the gaps in the whole array of the legislation. A significant number of provisions of the 
legislation is represented by subordinate regulatory and legal instruments, and not by laws, 
characterized with their smaller legal force and significance. 
There are also many contradictions between the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
and the anti-corruption legislation. In particular, the Constitution prohibits a person to testify 
against himself, and this is the basis of the anti-corruption legislation, if acts related to 
corruption are committed against a person, the family of a public servant is obliged to report 
their incomes, although they have the right to refuse it etc. The creation and application of 
new provisions, the activities of law enforcement agencies will be inefficient without the 
elimination of existing gaps in the legal counteraction of corruption and money-laundering. 
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Fourth Chapter 
 
 
Peculiarities of Money Laundering in Sports 
 
4.1 Significance of sport in the world economy 
 
The growing trend of globalization makes it easier for criminal groups to use sports 
more for money laundering and other fraudulent transactions. 
It is increasingly difficult for the criminal community to make fraud with the help of 
various front companies and real estate transactions during the crisis, and also because of the 
obsolescence of schemes for money laundering. Therefore, criminals are increasingly using 
sports to implement their dirty business. Money laundering takes place perhaps under the 
guise of buying a club, transfer or rental of a player, as well as under the guise of a 
bookmaker’s office. 
Over the past thirty or forty years, money has become an integral part of big sports and 
their influence has both positive and negative factors. The development of sports, the 
construction of new sports schools, bases, and stadiums in countries “lagging behind” can be 
regarded as positive factors. Negative factors include corruption, mafia, money laundering 
and other illegal activities. 
According to the estimates of the European Commission, the sports sector occupies 
about 2% of the total GDP of the European Union. The importance of sports in the economy 
is confirmed by the following charts
105
. 
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Figure 6 Sports market growth and revenue (bln $) 
73 
 
Based on the chart, we can see that the growth in the revenues of the football sector far 
exceeds the incomes of other types of sports. This is due to the fact that such important 
football events as the Soccer World Cup, the European Championship, the Champions League 
and the UEFA Europa League bring more money than for example the Formula 1 Grand Prix, 
Wimbledon or NBA games. An important factor is that the sports market with an annual 
growth of 7% is growing faster than the GDP of most countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMEA North America 
Asia Pacific Latin America 
32.8 bn $ 29.0 bn $ 
9.7 bn $ 4.5 bn $ 
Figure 7 Global sports market, % 
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Analysing the income in different geographical areas in more details, we can say that 
football is the most profitable sports in 3 areas: EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa), Asia 
Pacific and Latin America with incomes of 27.1, 4 and 3.6 bn. $, respectively. As for North 
America, the most popular sports here are the so-called U.S. Sports (basketball, American 
football, baseball) which brought 26.3 bn. $. Football has brought less than 1 bn. $
106
 “only”. 
Given the huge cash turnover, it is not difficult to guess that the sports sector is a tasty morsel 
for many criminal groups. 
 
4.2 Sport as an instrument for legalization of criminal incomes 
 
Money laundering in sports can take place in various forms, from the simplest ones, 
using frontmen, to the most sophisticated ones, such as illegal possession of advertising 
rights, illegal cross-border money transfers, tax evasion, etc. 
The sports industry is viewed by criminal groups not only as a source where money 
can be laundered and profit can be illegally appropriated, but also where a criminal can obtain 
the image and reputation of “benefactors” acting solely disinterestedly and in the name of 
such noble goals as the development of mass sports, support of children's and youth sports 
and other. This image, allows them to avoid proper financial control by the tax and other 
regulatory authorities, and hope for indulgence from the law enforcement agencies. 
In addition, criminal sponsors receive the necessary social and “legal” status in the 
local community, free access to the elite of society. Criminal leaders, in their opinion, as if 
buying an “admission ticket” into society, become popular figures. 
This “legalization” allow criminals to conduct their “shadow” business more 
successfully and even receive budgetary funds, in particular, profitable contracts for the 
construction of sports facilities (thereby also masking the receipt of their criminal proceeds). 
According to the experts of FATF
107
, high profitability of certain types of entertaining 
sports events, excessive commercialization of sports, attraction of large investments into this 
sphere, a complex and diverse network of numerous legal entities and individuals (agents, 
sponsors, clubs, offshore companies) associated therewith promote money laundering in 
professional sports. The most “vulnerable” to money laundering are sports such as football, 
basketball, hockey, horse racing, motorcycle racing and volleyball. 
Some athletes, who have become dollar millionaires, begin to invest in the “money 
laundering” business themselves. For example, some players of FC Zenit (St. Petersburg) 
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granted high interest “loans” in the amount of more than 70 million roubles to criminal 
leaders of the Tambov organized criminal community for servicing “clients” in financial 
schemes for laundering of “dirty” money108. 
As noted by the FATF experts, sports is “vulnerable” to criminal activities in 
connection with the lack of adequate professional management, unpredictability of sports 
performance, large disparities in the salaries of athletes and coaches. Thus, one talented player 
can bring huge and difficult to control revenues to a sports club, while losing only one 
promises a serious deterioration of the financial situation. Both cases create conditions for the 
use of “dirty” money109. 
The process of legalization of criminal proceeds is facilitated by a huge turnover of 
cash in the sphere of sports, which allows criminals to come up with various schemes for 
exchanging small bills for large ones, transferring cash to non-cash. 
It is noteworthy that the existing mechanisms for financing sports clubs, including 
charitable donations and sponsorship, play a special role in money laundering in professional 
sports. 
 
4.2.1 Russian sports financing mechanisms 
 
If in the US, Canada and a number of European countries professional sports in many 
ways is a developed business structure, and is self-sustaining from the proceeds of ticket 
sales, advertising, broadcast of matches, etc., in Russia in most cases it is loss-making and 
exists at the expense of state support, sponsorship and charity of Russian oligarchs. 
At the same time, the state support of sports is constantly growing, which is clearly 
seen through the example of Russian football. Thus, Russia spent about 1.3 billion US dollars 
on the current expenses of football clubs of the Russian Premier League and the National 
League in 2012-2013, 1.6 billion US dollars in 2014-2015, and will spend 1.9 billion US 
dollars in 2016-2017
110
. And this despite the fact that Russian football clubs, in contrast to 
other types of sports, really have the opportunity to profit from their professional activities. 
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Thus, V. Galkin writes about Russian sports as a “surrealistic phenomenon111”, 
combining therein simultaneously obvious unprofitability and unreasonable salaries of 
players, exorbitant amounts of transfer transactions in a “poor” country by international 
standards. 
Almost all large sports clubs and teams in Russia are financed by state corporations 
(OJSC Gazprom, Rosneft, RZD, VTB, Sberbank, Rosoboronexport, etc.). For example, well-
known Russian oligarch Vladimir Potanin finances aquabike (jet sport racing); Arkady 
Rotenberg finances Dynamo hockey club; Gennady Timchenko finances Army Sports Club 
hockey team (St. Petersburg); Vladimir Lisin finances the Shooting Union of Russia; Mikhail 
Prokhorov finances the Russian Biathlon Union; Alisher Usmanov and his wife Irina Viner 
finance Russian Fencing Federation, Russian Canoe Federation, Russian Rhythmic 
Gymnastics Federation, etc. 
It should be noted that such sponsorship is very successful at times. It is reasonable to 
mention charity by Vladimir Potanin, a representative of the world-famous philanthropic 
campaign named Oath of Donation, whereof members are obliged to give half or more of 
their fortune to charity. Potanin himself has already spent about 2.5 billion US dollars for the 
construction and operation of Rosa Khutor Olympic ski resort and the Russian International 
Olympic University in Sochi
112
. Moreover, he transfers the ownership over the university 
building to the state and continues to finance the academic teaching of students of this 
university at his own expense. 
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It is no secret that charity itself is sometimes imposed by the state, which turns this 
voluntary business into an indispensable condition for the functioning of large business. 
Sometimes, large business spares no expenses for big sports, wishing to show its loyalty to 
the current regime of power. Unfortunately, there is almost no benefit from such charitable 
big money received in professional sports (sometimes rashly and without the desire to achieve 
specific results). Moreover, such “easy” and uncontrolled money often corrupts athletes and 
coaches, creating the conditions for theft and financial abuse. 
Other “philanthropists” are engaged therein in the field of professional sports on a 
really voluntary basis, but solely guided by criminal motives. After all, such charitable 
activity is only one of the convenient ways to legalize proceeds obtained by criminal means, 
especially by organized criminal groups. 
Some sports clubs become actually depended on such “charitable” capital. Thus, 
Spartak hockey club (Moscow) appeared in a difficult financial situation in 2013, the actual 
owner of which was Investbank deprived of a license for dubious financial transactions. This 
bank funded this sports club in full, and had “its” people113 (insiders) in its leadership. 
Sports in the post-Soviet countries became a very “comfortable” place for criminal 
investments immediately after the collapse of the USSR. It is no coincidence that professional 
sports and mafia became similar concepts in the 1990's, as many sports clubs were the 
favourite haven of organized criminal groups in those years.  
Unfortunately, the positive changes do not happen so quickly, but the criminals 
continue to circle around the Russian sports. Thus, in September of 2011, R. Saimanov, the 
sports director of Rubin football club was sentenced to 8.5 years of imprisonment
114
 for 
creating a gang and organizing the killing of seven people. Saimanov was responsible for 
financing of Rubin football club and its transfer policy. Major criminal investments in the 
“purchase and sale” of football players and successful performances of football players of this 
club were associated with his name. 
Football in Russia may not be so openly or on such a large scale as it was in the 
1990’s, but it is still financed and at the same time embezzled by the legalized criminal 
leaders. In particular, some representatives of the football world declare the direct 
participation of criminals and dubious characters in financial transactions related to the 
activities of such well-known football clubs as Zenit, Rubin and Rostov
115
. 
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For example, here is a description of the state of modern Russian football given by A. 
Aminov: “The so-called football family is today a thief clan that turned the beautiful industry 
into a rotting event called Russian football, with a price tag of over 1.5 billion euros a year 
and shameful income of 45 million US dollars. They need an annual growth of budgets, lack 
of control, weak RFU without any publicity
116”. Perhaps, this is an overly categorical and 
straightforward conclusion, which does not fully reflect the objective situation in Russian 
football, but, unfortunately, widely known facts and circumstances cannot help but alarm. 
For example, at various stages the patron of the football clubs, such as Krylya Sovetov 
(Saratov), Volga (Nizhny Novgorod), Dynamo (Makhachkala) was called “authoritative 
businessman” Osman Kadiev, who is still wanted by the US FBI for extortion and 
communication with organized crime. Kadiev was a founder of a casino network in various 
cities of Russia, and currently promotes the idea of combining Dynamo and Anzhi
117
, two 
Dagestan football clubs. 
It is possible to give another example. Thus, a leader of the Podolsk OCG (organized 
crime group), very rich and well-known in the criminal world, S.N. Lalakin (the nickname 
“Luchok”), is now not only an honorary citizen of the city of Podolsk, manages Vityaz the 
central city sports club, but, according to some information, became one of the “beneficiaries” 
of Zenit, a famous Russian football club. And this is no wonder, there are people connected in 
the past with organized crime, accused of racketeering, creating front firms for laundering 
“dirty” money even among the leaders of the all-Russian sports federations of sports. The 
entry of such persons is still undesirable for many countries. It is interesting that some of 
them have recently had affiliated institutions engaged in business in the field of professional 
sports, which were headed by their close relatives. These institutions controlled the 
withdrawal and laundering of Olympic money, transfer contracts, etc. And all these 
outrageous facts of the sports community are well known and openly discussed in the mass 
media. 
 
4.2.2 Investing criminal money in foreign sports as a way of money laundering 
 
Large opportunities for money laundering for criminal groups are represented by 
investing in foreign sports business, especially in sports clubs that work with a large amount 
of cash and have a network of all kinds of small firms related to the gambling business, 
offshore zones, etc. 
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Recently, the number of billionaires, mainly from the post-Soviet countries, investing 
money in the sport of Western countries, has increased enormously. Natives of the former 
USSR invested huge sums in sports clubs of Great Britain, the USA, Italy, Greece, Holland, 
Israel and many other leading countries of the world (including, probably, the reason of 
legalizing their not absolutely lawful money). 
It is interesting that the authorities of large Western countries, who have proclaimed an 
implacable fight against money laundering, in fact actively promote the investment of dubious 
Russian capital in the sports industry of their countries. On the contrary, they do not show any 
special sensitivity in studying the legitimacy of the origin of this money (Pecunia non 
olet?
118
). 
A “trend setter” of investing money into foreign sports is undoubtedly the famous 
Russian billionaire, the “citizen” of the world, R. Abramovich, who bought Chelsea football 
club in 2003, and invested in its purchase and development, according to Forbes, 1.3 billion 
US dollars
119
. However, it should be acknowledged that R. Abramovich helped a little 
Russian sports as well: he created the National Academy of Football, a charity organization, 
financed the salary of Guus Hiddink, the Russian national team ex-coach, and built a number 
of sports facilities in regions. 
Abramovich's example was contagious. Thus, another famous Russian oligarch M. 
Prokhorov invested almost 200 million US dollars in the construction of the sports arena in 
Brooklyn and the acquisition of a controlling stake in New Jersey
120
, a leading US basketball 
team. 
It is also possible to single out other large Russian businessmen who invested colossal 
funds in foreign sports. A. Usmanov is a shareholder of Arsenal football club, I. Savvidi of 
Greek PAOK, Chigirinsky of Dutch Vitesse, Yu. Korablin (former mayor of Khimki Moscow 
area) of FC Venezia.  
Insufficiently patriotic position of some Russian oligarchs and large businessmen can 
be understood, since many of them are guided by purely commercial interests, including those 
related to the expansion of their foreign business and the availability of “private jets” in a 
number of comfortable countries for living. But how can we understand the activities of some 
of the largest state corporations and the so-called “natural monopolies”, investing fabulous 
amounts of money into foreign sports instead of Russian sports? 
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For example, according to press reports, OJSC Gazprom has already provided 
sponsorship to Schalke 04 German football team in the amount of 125 million euros. It is also 
suggested to spend, according to some information, about 40 million euros, to participate in 
the official partnership of the UEFA Champions League and 4 million euros for the 
maintenance of Crvena Zvezda (Red Star) Serbian youth football team. It is also planned to 
supply gas and electricity to Chelsea football club. It is no coincidence that the correspondent 
of Novaya Gazeta {from Russian, New Newspaper} asks a sacramental question: “Chelsea, 
Schalke, Crvena Zvezda are gasified ... Why do not we see these localities on the map of 
Russia?
121”. 
In July 2013, another major state-owned company in Russia, OJSC Aeroflot, suddenly 
refused to sponsor CSKA, the Russian football club, and preferred to enter into a sponsorship 
contact with Manchester United (according to the British press, amounting to 100 million 
pounds). In particular, as an official carrier, Aeroflot will provide services for this club in 
“arrangements and strategic advising” and even paint one of its planes in the colours of 
Manchester United
122
. 
At the same time, the Russian Football Union is experiencing financial difficulties and 
great challenges in obtaining sponsorship and charitable assistance. N. Tolstykh, the RFU 
head stated that he had twice asked Gazprom to extend the sponsorship contract with the 
RFU, but there was no response
123
. 
The money of OJSC Gazprom continues to “emerge” abroad, sometimes under 
unexpected circumstances. For example, in Spain in 2013, Andrei Petrov, a certain 
“developer”, who has laundered 56 million “dirty” euros received from Russia through a local 
hockey club, was detained. According to the press, the source of abundant financial injections 
from abroad was Gazprom. The specified “developer” organized in this country an organized 
criminal community, which included a member of the Parliament of Catalonia, the president 
of the hockey club and other “substantial” people124. 
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4.2.3 Some ways of “dirty” money laundering under the guise of charity and sponsors support 
 
FATF experts note a lot of ways to launder “dirty” money in sports committed by 
representatives of organized criminal communities and the criminal world. 
As a rule, “dirty” money comes through various affiliates at a time when the sports 
club is experiencing serious financial difficulties. It is interesting that money comes with the 
blessing of federal, regional or municipal authorities often, provided that “benefactors” will 
get the opportunity to receive state or municipal orders for the construction of sports and other 
facilities. In fact, such orders are received by criminals who launder their “dirty” money in 
such a way successfully. 
Sometimes criminal investors simply buy a sports club for “dirty” money. Afterwards, 
they recapitalize the newly acquired property by obtaining loan facilities. The value of the 
club's shares rises sharply after investing in the development of the club, the purchase of 
players, etc. Loans are repaid through the issuance of new shares. The controlling stake 
remains in the hands of criminal investors. “Dirty” money and legal revenue receipts are 
mixed up, disguised. It is difficult to establish the fact of money laundering, and sometimes it 
is simply impossible. 
One can also face the opposite situation, when a sports club is acquired by criminal 
investors for money obtained legally. These investors “promote” the image of the club, raise 
the salaries of players and coaches, purchase new sports equipment, and build sports 
infrastructure facilities. However, purchases and contracted construction work is carried out 
exclusively through “their” firms, controlled by them, at very high prices. All the profits from 
contracted work and sales are transferred later to the management of an offshore company 
controlled by an organized criminal community. Thus, apparently quite “legitimate” 
commercial activity of the sports club becomes an important tool in the laundering of criminal 
money. 
It is characteristic that criminals, owning a club, can launder “dirty” money regularly 
and in large volumes, using simple fraudulent methods, for example, by manipulating 
accounting documents, artificially increasing the incomes and turnover of money allegedly 
coming from the sale of tickets, service companies, trade and public catering on the premises 
a sports facility. 
Thus, you can often observe a situation when the stadium is full of empty seats, 
although supposedly all tickets are sold, including those at high prices. Along with other 
objective reasons, this situation can be explained by the implementation of the money 
laundering scheme. In particular, an attempt made by criminal owners or managers of this 
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sports facility to launder money by fictitious buying a large number of tickets from 
themselves in order to legalize their small bills received from criminal proceeds (drug sales, 
prostitution, illegal gambling). 
Sponsors support provided to sports clubs, including from well-known international 
companies, does not always correspond to the requirements of the applicable laws. For 
example, Horst Dassler (the son of a founder of Adidas) has established International Sport 
and Leisure (ISL), which has entered into sponsorship contacts with FIFA, IAAF and the IOC 
to advertise products produced by Adidas France. Sponsorship money came to the bank 
regularly, where there was already a list of sports officials who were entitled to “legitimate” 
extra payments for entering into such a sponsorship contract. Thus, illegal income of mafia 
sports officials was legalized
125
. 
Criminal investments are also very well laundered by organizing “fixed” matches 
using bookmaker’s offices, Internet totalizers126, as well as transactions related to the 
“purchase and sale” of football players. For example, a “benefactor” agrees to transfer 10 
million euros for the conclusion of a transfer deal for the player. However, he really 
negotiates the transfer of 5 million euros, the rest of 5 million euros is returned to him by the 
sports club through various offshore schemes. As a result, 5 million “dirty” euros are 
“laundered” and acquire a legal origin.  
As experts FATF note, deliberate misleading of the sports community about ostensibly 
very high price for “sports goods” to receive “surplus value” lays in a basis of this criminal 
way of money laundering. And for some reason, often the competent authorities do not want 
to ask what the real market price of “bought” and “sold” football players is, and where 
fraudulent actions, money laundering and direct deception of the sports world are.  
The Russian market of criminal transfers, participation of football agents for the use of 
“kick-back127” schemes and laundering of “dirty” money therein is a serious problem for 
today. However, it should be noted that this is not only a purely Russian, but also a big 
international problem. For example, in 2013, the Italian Tax Police suspected 41 football 
clubs and 12 football agents in money laundering in transfer transactions, and immediately 
took adequate measures. La Gazzetta dello Sport reported that the searches took place in the 
offices of Milan, Juventus, Napoli and Lazio. Parma, Atalanta, Genoa, Catania, Palermo, 
                                                          
125
 Jennings A. Who is killing FIFA. Strangeness of world football. 2011, page 365. 
126
 Practice  in  fighting  against  match-fixing (criminological analysis and practice)]. Vestnik RMOU – RIOU 
Bulletin, 2012, no. 3. 
127
 A kickback is a form of negotiated bribery in which a commission is paid to the bribe-taker in exchange for 
services rendered [en.wikipedia.org]. 
83 
 
Fiorentina and some other teams were also mentioned. Unfortunately, law enforcement bodies 
in Russia prefer not to deal with this problem at all, unlike Western countries.  
 
4.3 FC Tiraspol Case 
 
In May of 2015, FC Tiraspol ceased to exist. The reason for this was a loud scandal 
connected with the illegal possession of the club and, as a result, with serious violations of the 
FIFA and UEFA Charters. The fact of the illegality of the existence of football clubs, such as 
Tiraspol and Sheriff, remains relevant even today. 
From the scheme below, we see that FC Tiraspol and FC Sheriff are under the control 
of one owner, Mr. V.A. Gushan, which contradicts Article 18 of Part 2 of the FIFA Charter 
fundamentally: «Every Member shall ensure that its affiliated clubs can take all decisions on 
any matters regarding membership independently of any external body. This obligation 
applies regardless of an affiliated club’s corporate structure. In any case, the Member shall 
ensure that neither a natural nor a legal person (including holding companies and subsidiaries) 
exercises control over more than one club whenever the integrity of any match or competition 
could be jeopardised». 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The extract from the state register of legal entities of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian 
Republic states that the owners of FC Tiraspol 
128
 are as follows: 
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1) Oleg Anatolyevich Dovgopol, a share of participation amounts to 1%. 
2) Centr-Market, LLC, Tiraspol, a share of participation amounts to 99%. 
In turn, the owners of Centr-Market, LLC are as follows: Dmitry Mikhailovich 
Kazmaly, with a share of participation of  95% and Oleg Anatolyevich Dovgopol, with a 
share of participation of 5%. 
The Director of Centr-Market, LLC is Oleg Anatolyevich Dovgopol. Before the 
appointment of O.A. Dovgopol as Director of Centr-Market, LLC, as follows from his 
biography, he was the head of the legal department of FC Sheriff since 2000, and he 
combined his activities with the position of a deputy since 2005. He did not have any business 
prior to assuming the office of the Director of Centr-Market, LLC. In any case, there is no 
information about any other activities related to business after the position of the lawyer of 
Sheriff club.  
As follows from the PMR
129
 President's Decree No.897 as of  November 23, 2011, 
D.M. Kazmaly was the Warehouse Manager of the trading storage of Sheriff, LLC and was 
subordinate to V.A. Gushan the President of Sheriff, LLC and FC Sheriff. Kazmaly was 
awarded a medal “For Distinguished Conduct in Labour” for selfless labour in a position of 
“the Head of the warehouse of the trading storage of Sheriff, LLC”.  
Initially, Centr-Market, LLC – was established to privatize the Tiraspol city market. 
On March 15, 2007, Centr-Market, LLC was registered, and the Tiraspol city market was 
privatized in the same period. Based on the PMR President's Decree No.234RP as of March 
26, 2007, the Tiraspol city market was successfully privatized. The balance-sheet value of the 
facility amounted approximately to 460 thousand US dollars. In addition to the privatization 
of the facility, the company undertook to invest in the improvement of the market, as follows 
from the official web site of Centr-Market, LLC. 
Upon its establishment, Centr-Market, LLC conducts the construction and 
commissioning of trading buildings and pavilions at full tilt. At least from the beginning of 
2012, D.M. Kazmaly, holding the position of the Warehouse Manager of the trading storage 
of Sheriff, LLC, becomes the owner of a 95% stake in Centr-Market, LLC, which owns: 
- an object (Tiraspol city market), acquired in the process of privatization with a 
balance-sheet value of at least 460 thousand US dollars; 
- with investment commitments to improve the infrastructure of the city market; 
- the owner of FC Tiraspol with an annual budget of at least 500 thousand euros. 
There is an insignificant likelihood ratio that D.M. Kazmaly discovered 
entrepreneurial competencies, at least 1.5 years before, and became a co-owner of the football 
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club, participating in European competitions and taking the 3rd place in the Moldovan 
National Division, independently. In due course, O.A. Dovgopol is a member of the Renewal 
party, which is quoted even by Wikipedia
130
 as party that represents, among other things, the 
interests of Sheriff. From the above facts it becomes clear that the owners of FC Tiraspol, 
namely the founders of the main beneficiary – Centr-Market, LLC – are fictitious owners and 
are controlled (including financially) by a third person, Sheriff Holding Company, LLC, 
namely, by its President V.Gushan. By the way, I.M. Kazmaly, a brother of D.M. Kazmaly 
held and office of the Director of Sheriff Holding Company during the same period. Thus, 
Centr-Market, LLC, owning 99% of the shares in FC Tiraspol, has the following composition 
of owners: 
1) D.M. Kazmaly officially held the position of the Warehouse Manager of the trading 
storage of Sheriff, LLC, at least until January of 2012, and he holds a 95% stake in Centr-
Market, LLC, with assets exceeding 1 million euros as of April of 2013, and owns 99% of the 
shares of FC Tiraspol, with the minimum budget of 500 thousand euros per year. 
2) O.A. Dovgopol officially held the position of the lawyer of FC Sheriff, was the 
Director of Centr-Market, LLC since 2007, has a share of participation in FC Tiraspol and 
Centr-Market, LLC, works as a deputy, and does not even have a hint of work in companies 
other than those connected with Sheriff (he worked in the state security agencies until 2000). 
In less than a few years, these citizens prove themselves to be successful 
entrepreneurs, win a privatization contest, receive the ownership of the Tiraspol city market, 
invest significant funds in its development, and then become owners of FC Tiraspol, officially 
eligible to participate in matches under the auspices of UEFA and taking the 3rd place in the 
Moldovan National Division of the Championship. Did the Moldovan Football Federation 
have any doubts at the time when the license of FC Tiraspol was issued?  
The only found sponsor of FC Tiraspol was Tirotex. FC Tiraspol does not conduct an 
active transfer policy, does not own a sports infrastructure, its fan club does not exceed 50 
people, and there are no confirmed sales of television broadcasts. The club depends solely on 
the funds invested by Centr-Market, LLC or Tirotex, its sponsor. There is no information 
about the sponsor on the web site of FC Tiraspol. The only sponsor, judging by the location of 
the logo on the uniform of players, is Tirotex. Tirotex is 100% owned by Capital Invest, LLC. 
The owners of Capital Invest, LLC are the following: 
1) V.A. Gushan, with a 10% stake, who holds an office of the President of FC Sheriff 
concurrently. 
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2) Edemona Limited, LLC, a Cyprus company, with a 90% stake (most likely it is 
owned by Gushan himself or beneficiaries close thereto). The Director of Capital Invest, LLC 
is D.V. Ogirchuk, who holds an office of the CEO of Sheriff, LLC concurrently. 
Tirotex in fact is the only possible financial donor of FC Tiraspol. In the event that 
Centr-Market, LLC does not have the ability to provide the club with funds for any reason, 
the activities of FC Tiraspol directly depend on the decision of the management of Tirotex. 
The management of Capital Invest and its shareholder can directly instruct the management of 
Tirotex on the issues of financing FC Tiraspol. 
The management and the shareholder of Capital Invest are affiliated entities of Sheriff, 
LLC and FC Sheriff. V.A. Gushan holds in both entities two top positions, namely the office 
of the President. Sponsorship in FC Tiraspol has a fictitious basis. Tirotex carries out the 
insuring activity of financial security of FC Tiraspol exclusively. Conditions where under FC 
Tiraspol will receive sponsorship from Tirotex depend personally on D.V. Ogirchuk, the CEO 
of Sheriff, LLC, and V. Gushan, the President of FC Sheriff. Having disclosed the structure of 
the owners of FC Tiraspol and the source of funding from Tirotex, it is necessary to specify 
the rules for the prohibition of such ties by FIFA and UEFA in accordance with Part 2 of 
Article 18 of the FIFA Charter: «Every Member shall ensure that its affiliated clubs can take 
all decisions on any matters regarding membership independently of any external body. This 
obligation applies regardless of an affiliated club’s corporate structure131». 
In any case, the Member (the Football Federation of Moldova) shall ensure that neither 
individuals nor legal entities (including holding companies and affiliates) exercise control 
over more than one club, whenever the integrity of any match or competition may be 
jeopardized. 
According to the article 9.2.1 criteria «А» L 0.3 FIFA Regulations Club Licensing: 
«Ownership and control of clubs: The license applicant must submit a legally valid 
declaration outlining the ownership structure and control mechanism of the clubs and 
confirming the following: 
No natural or legal person involved in the management, administration and/or sporting 
performance of the club, either directly or indirectly:  
a) holds or deals in the securities or shares of any other club participating in the same 
competition;  
b) holds a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights of any other club participating in 
the same competition;  
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c) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory body of any other club participating in the same competition;  
d) is a shareholder and alone controls a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights of 
any other club participating in the same competition pursuant to an agreement entered into 
with other shareholders of the club in question;  
e) is a member of any other club participating in the same competition;  
f) is involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or 
sporting performance of any other club participating in the same competition;  
g) has any power whatsoever over the management, administration and/or sporting 
performance of any other club participating in the same club competition
132». 
FIFA deliberately does not provide the exact concept of direct control in order to cover 
the existence of any connections, corporate entities that can influence the management of a 
football club and the achievement of sports results by a club by its definition. Indeed, V.A. 
Gushan, an affiliate of FC Sheriff does not directly own shares in FC Tiraspol, does not own 
shares in Centr-Market, LLC. He has indirect control through the fake owners of Centr-
Market, LLC over the management of FC Tiraspol and has the ability to influence its sporting 
results, taking into account paragraphs f) and g): both owners of FC Tiraspol were employed 
by Sheriff: both the club and the holding company. 
 The majority participant, D.M. Kazmaly was, at least until January 2012, in direct 
subordination of the President of FC Sheriff and the President of Sheriff, LLC, while holding 
the position of the Warehouse Manager of the trading storage of Sheriff, LLC. Within a short 
period of time, both owners became owners of an asset that exceeds their income 
significantly, in addition, D.M. Kazmaly, being a simple manager of the warehouse of Sheriff, 
LLC, begins to manage FC Tiraspol after some time. In accordance with Part 3 of article 51 
bis UEFA Statutes: «Altering the legal form or company structure of a club to facilitate its 
qualification on sporting merit and/or its receipt of a licence for a domestic league 
championship, to the detriment of the integrity of a sports competition, is prohibited. This 
includes, for example, changing the headquarters, changing the name or transferring 
stakeholdings between different clubs. Prohibitive decisions must be able to be examined by 
the Member Association’s body of appeal133». 
The UEFA Charter specifically prohibits the use of data concealment schemes for real 
club owners. A fraud with the replacement of the labour order and forged records in the work 
record book and indications that D.M. Kazmaly had no relation to Sheriff, LLC was 
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misleading. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that these two clubs participate in 
European competitions, these two clubs take the first lines of the championship, and most 
importantly, FC Tiraspol and FC Sheriff represent control, impact on the sports results by one 
owner. 
 
4.4 Rostov Case
134
 
 
At the turn of 2006-2007, the following financing model was chosen for financing the 
main sports team of the region, FC Rostov in the administration of the Rostov region: non-
profit organizations began to be introduced into the scheme for paying for contracts of 
football players, coaches and other club employees to provide financial intermediation 
services. The Fund for Support and Development of Professional and Youth Football and the 
Fund for Support and Development of Football in the Rostov Region were among the first 
such NGOs. 
These funds had not only almost similar names, identical addresses, were established 
and administered by the same persons, but also a common operational task, which is to cover 
the expenses of the club. 
The scheme worked as follows: when entering into an employment contract between a 
club and a football player, the latter was offered to sign an agreement with the fund, within 
which a player received part of the income in the form of financial assistance. Commercial 
enterprises registered in the region (including those with state participation) transferred funds 
to the Fund by the order of the regional administration, and the latter provided an additional 
payment to the employees of the club. 
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Proceeding from the scheme, it becomes obvious that the club involved non-profit 
organizations for the so-called tax optimization. The money of sponsors came to the Fund in 
the form of donations and in accordance with Article 149 of the Tax Code of the Russian 
Federation was not subject to taxes, as well as payments of the fund itself to football players 
in accordance with Article 217 of the Tax Code. 
A year after the start of a new scheme, the first failures happened: the football players 
stopped receiving money from the Fund and appealed to the Chamber for Dispute Resolution 
of the RFU
135
. But the chamber, which considered employment disputes between the club and 
a football player only, proved to be incompetent in the proceedings with third parties, and 
made several unfavourable decisions. 
After that, the financing scheme was modified somewhat: the club itself was included 
in the cooperation between a player and the Fund, with which both parties began to conclude 
surety agreements. Thus, the club began to act as a guarantor of payments to players, and the 
Fund entered the legal field of the RFU partially. 
Later, as evidenced by the former employee of the RFU, agreements with the Fund 
were concluded by all employees of the club, including the CEO, which allowed reducing the 
load on the payroll sheet of the club by transferring the main cash flow to the Fund. The 
financing model was optimal, so only the sites and persons responsible for filling the club's 
budget from the regional budget were changing. 
The fund began to receive more money after the change of power in the Rostov region. 
Judging by the data of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, the increase was 
significant: “the National Sports Development Fund of the Rostov Region, NGO received 
more than 2 billion roubles on its current account with the Russian National Bank (the same 
bank was also the settlement bank for the football club) during the period of 2011-2013”. 
The Fund, according to its Charter, had a wide range of types of statutory activities: 
from promoting healthy lifestyles and supporting veterans of sports to participating in the 
implementation of the Federal Programme for the «Development of Physical Culture and 
Sports for 2006-2015». However, as established by the tax authorities, this statutory activity 
was not financed in the first place. Based on the materials of the tax audit: “90% of all 
payments accounted for the financial support of football players, coaches and club employees. 
Funds received as donations to the Sports Development Fund of the Rostov region, NGO, 
were indirectly managed by Rostov Football Club to encourage players and coaching staff, 
that is, this organization was created only in the interests of the football club.” In addition, the 
Fund began to issue loans to the club. 
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Let’s consider the payroll of the club's employees and the proportion of payments of 
the club and the Fund. According to the data of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring 
for 2012, the goalkeeper of Rostov, Stipe Pletikosa, received 23.5 million roubles in  a form 
of financial assistance from the Fund, while his annual income amounted to 7.6 million in the 
club; Aleksandr Gatskan received a grant in the amount of 18 million roubles (and 7.3 million 
roubles in the club); Roman Adamov received charitable assistance and a grant in the amount 
of 17 million roubles (3.3 million); Isaac Okoronkvo received 21 million roubles in the form 
of financial assistance (3.2 million); the financial assistance to the head coach, Miodrag 
Bozhovich, amounted to 17.8 million roubles (and 4.8 million in the club). The main purpose 
of this scheme was tax optimization. The money was received by the football players in a 
form of grants, charitable or material assistance, and these payments, according to the Tax 
Code, were not subject to the 13% income tax, and the actual employer of the players (Rostov 
Football Club) avoided insurance payments (about 30% of the employee's income amount). 
If we take into account that more than 2 billion roubles were allocated to the fund were 
given free of charge to the employees of the club, it is not difficult to calculate how much the 
Rostov Region (budget and the Pension Fund) was underpaid during the period of 2011-2013, 
i.e. nearly about 1 billion roubles. 
Mikhail Filippov, an expert at Nalogovik
136
, says that these transactions could be 
contrary to the Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations Federal Act: “Judging by 
the picture described, the main source of income for the players was the charitable fund. If 
these payments were systematic, then we can conclude as follows: the money was sent by the 
Fund to perform the functions of the athletes, which they had to perform in accordance with 
the current employment contracts with the club. In this case, the tax authority can consider 
this as intentional tax evasion. Therefore, the materials can be sent to the law enforcement 
agencies for the adoption of a procedural decision to initiate criminal proceedings on the 
grounds of Article 199 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (evasion from 
payment of taxes)”. 
The expert also notes that the decision of the Inter-District Department of the Federal 
Tax Service No.23 gave examples of only two sponsors who financed the team through the 
Fund: Donenergosbyt, LLC and Combine Plant Rostselmash, LLC. 
These enterprises entered into an agreement with the club for the provision of 
advertising services during the home matches of RFPL-SOGAZ in the 2011/12 season, while 
Rostov showed a small amount of revenue from these transactions, and major funds were 
received under financial assistance agreements by the Sports Development Fund of the 
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Rostov region, NGO. Further, the sponsor's money received on the Fund's account was 
transferred to personal card accounts and personal accounts of football players, coaching staff 
and club employees in a form of grants and financial assistance. Thus, the main payments 
were illegally not included in the VAT tax base. 
It should be noted that both enterprises were strategic for the Rostov region, and the 
list of transactions with the club indicated by the tax inspection (amounting to 70 million 
roubles) is clearly incomplete. 
It is also important that the audit was carried out by the Rostov Inspectorate, and it 
probably made the decision that it considered permissible under the conditions of its region. 
As for Donenergosbyt, LLC, this enterprise was one of the largest electric power 
suppliers in the region, which could cover the loss arisen as a result of multimillion-dollar 
gratuitous payments by increasing the tariffs for electricity for individuals and legal entities. 
In addition to advertising contracts, transfer transactions for the acquisition and sale of 
football players proved to be also interesting. One of them – regarding the sale of Rostov’s 
rights of Czech defender Roman Gubnik in 2010 – should be discussed separately. 
On April 30, 2010, Rostov Football Club signed an agency agreement with Sport 
Invest International, a Czech company of agent Viktor Kolarz, who represented the interests 
of former Spartak’s players, such as Martin Jiranek, Radoslav Kovac, Marek Suchy, and 
former Zenith’s players, such as Kamil Contofalsky, Radek Sirl. Under the terms of the 
described agreement, “the agent commits himself for a fee to do a complex of legal and other 
actions on behalf of OJSC Rostov Football Club aimed at selling the club's rights of Roman 
Gubnik to Hertha, a club of the German Bundesliga. That is, the player shall be transferred 
from Rostov to Hertha, and his agent shall assist in the implementation of this transfer and get 
commission therefor”. 
The deal itself with certain reservations is not remarkable, since someone had to 
perform some “technical work”. So, it was performed by Victor Kolarz: the transfer 
agreement between the clubs was concluded on May 13, 2010. And on September 8, 2010, 
Rostov Football Club received 900 thousand euros from German Hertha, and 890 thousand 
euros were transferred by the Russian club to the account of Sport Invest International into 
one of the banks of Prague on the same day. This amount turned out to be an agency fee of 
Kolarz’s company for the very “complex of legal and other actions”. Proceeding from the 
logic conclusions, FC Rostov received a delta of 10 thousand euros from the sale of the 
football player worth almost 1 million euros, but this is not also true: as established by the 
Tax Inspectorate No.23 of the Federal Tax Service, Rostov Football Club did not include 
VAT in the amount of 6 million roubles into the fee agreed with a foreign football agency. 
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Thus, from the externally profitable transaction, for which the club could receive about 1 
million euros, it received a loss of about 5.6 million roubles. 
The deal with the sale of Roman Gubnik, which formed a hole in the budget of 
Rostov, was not the only one wherein agent Victor Kolarz took part. On June 18, 2012, 
Rostov signed an agency agreement with Sport Invest International to provide services for the 
transfer of football player Mihail Papadopulos from Rostov to the Polish club of Zaglebie. On 
June 22, the transfer deal between the clubs was concluded: Rostov received from the Poles 
150 thousand euros soon, 50 thousand of which were transferred to the account of the agent. 
On June 28, 2012, another agency agreement was signed with Sport Invest International, this 
time regarding the arrangement of transfer of Jan Holenda, a football player of Anzhi. The 
transfer agreement between the clubs was signed on the next day already. As part of this 
transaction, Rostov transferred 250 thousand US dollars to the account of the Dagestanian 
club, and 200 thousand US dollars to the Prague bank to the account of Sport Invest 
International. 
Another big deal, which aroused great interest, was related to the transfer of Florent 
Sinama-Pongolle, the French forward to Rostov. On August 31, 2012, Rostov Football Club 
signed an agency contract with Friends & Football International LLC, which was the Serbian 
agent of Dejan Joksimovic, representing the interests of such players as Guillermo, a 
goalkeeper of Locomotive and Milos Krasic, a midfielder of Fenerbahce. 
The scope of the agreement between the club and the agent was the organization of the 
transfer of Sinama-Pongolle from the Portuguese club of Sporting. However, the contract of 
the player with the Portuguese expired on September 6, 2012, and he signed the contract with 
Rostov club in the status of a free agent already. Nevertheless, on September 19, Rostov paid 
an agency fee of 1 million euros to Friends & Football International LLC. Let’s take a closer 
look at this deal.  
This transfer was the first after returning of sports management under the leadership of 
Aleksandr Shikunov to the club. Using the principle of follow the money, we will try to track 
the way of the funds from the club to the ultimate beneficiary of this deal. Considering the 
fact that the Ministry of Sports in the Rostov region was appointed the main administrator of 
the budget allocated to Rostov Football Club in the form of a subsidy, it can be assumed that 
the expenses of Rostov Football Club for the services of Friends and Football International 
LLC (FFI) agent worth 1 million euros for football player Florent Stephane Sinama-Pongolle 
were reimbursed from the budget of the Rostov region. Who became an owner of this 
million?  
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According to the Commercial Register of the U.S. state of Delaware, where FFI is 
registered, the owners and managers of the company are concealed. In accordance with the 
agency agreement, the intermediary company in the transaction for the transfer of Sinama-
Pongolle was represented by the FIFA licensed agent, Dejan Joksimovic, a citizen of Serbia. 
According to the transfermarkt.com web site, analysing the connection of football agents with 
football players and publishing a cost estimate of players, FFI and Dejan Yoksimovic have 
never been connected to this football player. 
According to the Tax Inspectorate No.23 of the Federal Tax Service, FFI agency fee 
was paid from the club's foreign currency account on September 19, 2012 in the amount of 1 
million euros. According to the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, the funds were 
received from the club’s account to Russian National Bank, LLC to the account of the 
counterparty in the Montenegrin bank of Atlasmont Banka AD. The rights to Sinama-
Pongolle until September 6, 2012 belonged to Sporting Portuguese Club, but the football 
player was already a free agent at the time of entering into the employment contract.  
On the next day after receiving the money from Rostov, FFI signed an agreement with 
Trademarket Networks L.P. registered in Scotland (Suite 1, 78 Montgomery street, 
Figure 10 
94 
 
Edinburgh). The scope of the agreement was “provision of services for the transfer of Florent 
Sinama-Pongolle, the French player, to the Russian football club of Rostov”, and its actions 
“on successful mediation in the transfer of the French player from Sporting to Rostov are 
indicated among the special merits of Trademarket Networks L.P. The employer undertook to 
pay 650 thousand euros to its British partner. Such deals are devoid of legal meaning, because 
their main conditions are services that are no longer required in connection with the football 
player's transfer. Thus, Trademarket Networks L.P. could be used simply as a link for the 
further movement of money. 
There is no information about the owners and management of Trademarket Networks 
L.P. due to a special form of ownership of the company (Limited Partnership) in the 
Commercial Register of the UK. However, it is known from the contract that the interests of 
the company were represented by certain Taras Sokolovsky, and the settlement bank was AS 
Privatbank, the Latvian “daughter” of the group of companies of Privat of Ukrainian oligarch 
Ihor Kolomoiskyi. According to the SWIFT banking system, the money was received in full 
on the account of Trademarket Networks L.P. in the Latvian bank on October 1, 2012. 
On the same day, Trademarket Networks L.P. transferred the previously received 
amount of money to Drensler LLP, another British company (Suite 1, The Studio, St. 
Nicholas CLO SE Elstree, Herdfortshire WD 6) to an account opened all in the same AS 
Privatbank. This company is a next link in the money flow chain, and we know much more 
about it. According to the Commercial Register of the UK, Drensler LLP was registered in 
2006 and belonged to British Milltown Corporate Services Limited and Ireland & Overseas 
Acquisitions Limited for a long time. Two of these entities are well known in the world of 
transnational crime, since the services of the companies established thereby were used by 
criminal groups of various countries and stripes: from Mexican drug cartels to Asian “triads”. 
One of the latest promulgated facts about Milltown and Ireland & Overseas was the receipt of 
three billion hryvnias from the budget of Ukraine under state contracts in the energy sector by 
Gazenergoleasing controlled thereby (the possible beneficiary whereof was called the closest 
supporter of Viktor Yanukovych, People's Deputy of Ukraine Yurii Ivaniuschenko). 
It is noteworthy that there is no complete information on income and expense 
transactions in the financial report of Drensler LLP for 2012, and the company has 118 
thousand pounds on its account. 
The source of origin of money is not so important for people who administer the 
process of money laundering. However, it is important to understand that the area of 
application of sites for money laundering expands by means of sports: “clearing” the money 
of Mexican drug dealers, the same people and companies serve the interests of football 
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functionaries. It remains to find out who are they. To do this, we will return to the further 
movement of money, because the funds received earlier on the account of Drensler LLP in 
Privatbank did not remained there for a long time.  
On October 8, 2012, according to the data of the SWIFT banking system, Drensler 
LLP transferred 167 thousand euros to Caixabank S.A., a bank in Barcelona, to the account 
opened in its branch in Ibiza by Aleksandr Shikunov. According to the data of the Cadastral 
Register of Spain, Aleksandr Shikunov and his wife Tatyana Shikunova (who probably had 
equal access to the account in Caixabank S.A) acquired elite apartments, with an area of 116 
square meters and a market value of 506 thousand euros, in Ibiza in November 2012. 
Under the terms of the transaction, 123 thousand euros were paid to the former owner 
of the real estate as a result of the repayment of his mortgage loan, and the couple took out a 
mortgage loan all in the same Caixabank S.A to pay the rest of the cost of the apartment. 
Later, according to the SWIFT banking system, Drensler LLP transferred 50 thousand euros 
to Aleksandr Shikunov's account in Caixabank S.A. twice: on March 19 and June 30. 
There could be other transactions from Trademarket Networks and Drensler, but 
documentary evidences are currently not available. The picture is as follows: the money of the 
Rostov region budget from the club was sent to the Montenegrin bank to the account of a 
company registered in the U.S. state of Delaware, then moved to a Latvian bank to the 
account of a British company whereof associated persons are suspected of money laundering 
by foreign law enforcement agencies, and then found its owner in the person of Aleksandr 
Shikunov, who purchased real estate in Ibiza, an elite municipal formation of Spain. 
One question remains: who got the rest of the hundreds of thousands of euros driven 
out from the club through this long chain of offshore companies? The statutory documents of 
Rostov Football Club and its form of ownership (OJSC) establish a strict executive procedure 
for the settlement of major transactions – and the payment of 1 million euros to the agent, 
considering the low book value of the club's assets, should be considered as such – the 
decision on approval should be made by the Board of Directors. It was and remains composed 
of representatives of the Rostov officials and business elite entirely. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was the analysis of such a dangerous social phenomenon as 
money laundering. The major money laundering models and the risks associated therewith 
have been described. European measures to combat illegal operations have been considered 
and the activities of international organizations to ensure financial security have been 
determined. The role and importance of international financial intelligence units have been 
shown by an example of Italy. Based on the above material, an attempt has been made to 
systematize the list of threats that endanger stable development and functioning of an 
economic system. 
The main gaps in Russian legislation and their use in money laundering have been 
revealed in the paper. The activities of the Central Bank of Russia and its measures to prevent 
money laundering have been also analysed. 
Summarizing the chapters written: 
• The history of origin and development of the concept of legalization (laundering) of 
proceeds from crime, both in the US and Europe, and in Russia, from the 15th to the 20th 
century, is considered in the first chapter. The chapter deals with the major methods, ways 
and models of money laundering, which are the main issues of the modern economic science, 
due to the fact that the problem of money laundering due to globalization, the threat of serious 
consequences for the world community's economy has turned into the international problem 
in the 21st century. The money laundering activity of criminal organizations has been 
analysed, characteristic features have been detected, and also the example of the Russian 
model described the process and risks of using banking products and the banking sector for 
money laundering. 
• The Anti-Money Laundering Directive 2015/849 became the key figure in the second 
chapter. This chapter studies the current European mechanisms for countering the money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. Key disadvantages and advantages of regulation at 
national and international levels have been identified. The trends of the legal regulation of 
international cooperation in combating money laundering have been analysed. 
An important role in the chapter has been assigned to the activities of the international 
financial intelligence unit. Its main functions, typologies and duties have been considered. 
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The example of Italy made it possible to figure out the results that financial intelligence could 
achieve during 2013-2016 in more detail. 
Summing up the chapter, it can be confidently asserted that quite effective and 
efficient legal, organizational, structural and information mechanisms for countering the 
money laundering and corruption have been created in the EU. A positive trend is an 
integrated approach to the implementation of such interaction in the EU, taking into account 
the close and symbiotic relationship between these categories of crimes. This factor is 
certainly important given the complexity, danger, scale of these crimes and the need to 
combat them effectively and efficiently. 
• The main gaps in Russian legislation in the sphere of money laundering and 
corruption have been examined in the third chapter. A comparative analysis of the differences 
between criminal prosecution in Russia and the US has been carried out. Based on the results 
obtained, it can be concluded that to date the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation in 
the field of combating the money laundering is largely behind., does not comply with 
international legal standards and positive examples of legislative structures of foreign states. 
This affects the quality of counteraction to this type of crime negatively. 
To create an effective anti-money-laundering system in Russia based on international 
experience, it is necessary to take the following set of measures: 
– creation of a comprehensive system to prevent and hinder money laundering in 
conjunction with measures to improve the tax treatment, prevent capital outflow and reduce a 
scale of corruption; 
– improvement of legal mechanisms, strengthening regulation and supervision over 
companies and financial institutions; 
–·expansion of cooperation between the federal centre and regions in the field of 
combating money laundering; 
– formation of an interaction system between the state and the private sector aimed at 
pushing money laundering schemes out from business practice; 
–·more active participation of Russia in international cooperation in combating the 
money laundering. 
One of the main focalized point of the chapter has become the definition of measures 
to combat money laundering by the Central Bank of Russia and other federal agencies. The 
key importance of federal laws 134 and 115 has been determined. 
The final part of the chapter describes the Russian “legal” money laundering scheme 
and reveals shocking shortcomings of the Russian land code that allow corrupt officials to 
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engage in bribery and money laundering with impunity. Based on the results obtained, 
measures have been proposed to improve the land legislation. 
• The purpose of the fourth chapter was to identify weaknesses and loopholes for 
money laundering in modern sports. As the economic importance of sports, especially 
football, increases, over the past three decades, money has gradually begun to have major 
impact on the world of sports. Such cash inflow gives a positive effect, but it also has 
negative consequences. Taking into account the amount of money involved the risk of money 
laundering and corruption increases. 
The chapter identifies links with other well-known typologies of legalization of 
criminal proceeds, such as money laundering through trade operations, through the securities 
market, the real estate sector and betting houses. 
Also, some problems of financing the Russian sports, participation in this activity of 
representatives of the criminal world have been analysed. Specific measures to combat money 
laundering, as well as organized crime in the sphere of professional sports, have been 
proposed. 
In the final part, the criminal activity of two well-known football clubs, Sheriff 
Tiraspol and FC Rostov, has been described. A detailed analysis of shadow operations 
associated with player transfers, under-the-table wages and the influence of the owners of the 
clubs on the outcome of matches has been conducted. 
The results of the analysis showed that money laundering in football is a very serious 
problem, which shall be addressed not only at the national, but also at the international level. 
 
In this paper the problem of the significance and danger to the public of money 
laundering for the international community was raised. 
I believe that this thesis allowed showing the evolution of legal means of 
counteraction to this crime from a national to an international legal level. The results obtained 
in this thesis are quite interesting, given the importance that this problem has achieved in the 
modern context. 
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